Daily Papers

While Large Language Models (LLMs) demonstrate impressive reasoning capabilities, growing evidence suggests much of their success stems from memorized answer-reasoning patterns rather than genuine inference. In this work, we investigate a central question: are LLMs primarily anchored to final answers or to the textual pattern of reasoning chains? We propose a five-level answer-visibility prompt framework that systematically manipulates answer cues and probes model behavior through indirect, behavioral analysis. Experiments across state-of-the-art LLMs reveal a strong and consistent reliance on explicit answers. The performance drops by 26.90\% when answer cues are masked, even with complete reasoning chains. These findings suggest that much of the reasoning exhibited by LLMs may reflect post-hoc rationalization rather than true inference, calling into question their inferential depth. Our study uncovers the answer-anchoring phenomenon with rigorous empirical validation and underscores the need for a more nuanced understanding of what constitutes reasoning in LLMs.

Large language models (LLMs) have shown remarkable performances across a wide range of tasks. However, the mechanisms by which these models encode tasks of varying complexities remain poorly understood. In this paper, we explore the hypothesis that LLMs process concepts of varying complexities in different layers, introducing the idea of "Concept Depth" to suggest that more complex concepts are typically acquired in deeper layers. Specifically, we categorize concepts based on their level of abstraction, defining them in the order of increasing complexity within factual, emotional, and inferential tasks. We conduct extensive probing experiments using layer-wise representations across various LLM families (Gemma, LLaMA, QWen) on various datasets spanning the three domains of tasks. Our findings reveal that models could efficiently conduct probing for simpler tasks in shallow layers, and more complex tasks typically necessitate deeper layers for accurate understanding. Additionally, we examine how external factors, such as adding noise to the input and quantizing the model weights, might affect layer-wise representations. Our findings suggest that these factors can impede the development of a conceptual understanding of LLMs until deeper layers are explored. We hope that our proposed concept and experimental insights will enhance the understanding of the mechanisms underlying LLMs. Our codes are available at https://github.com/Luckfort/CD.

Scientific inquiry requires systems-level reasoning that integrates heterogeneous experimental data, cross-domain knowledge, and mechanistic evidence into coherent explanations. While Large Language Models (LLMs) offer inferential capabilities, they often depend on retrieval-augmented contexts that lack structural depth. Traditional Knowledge Graphs (KGs) attempt to bridge this gap, yet their pairwise constraints fail to capture the irreducible higher-order interactions that govern emergent physical behavior. To address this, we introduce a methodology for constructing hypergraph-based knowledge representations that faithfully encode multi-entity relationships. Applied to a corpus of ~1,100 manuscripts on biocomposite scaffolds, our framework constructs a global hypergraph of 161,172 nodes and 320,201 hyperedges, revealing a scale-free topology (power law exponent ~1.23) organized around highly connected conceptual hubs. This representation prevents the combinatorial explosion typical of pairwise expansions and explicitly preserves the co-occurrence context of scientific formulations. We further demonstrate that equipping agentic systems with hypergraph traversal tools, specifically using node-intersection constraints, enables them to bridge semantically distant concepts. By exploiting these higher-order pathways, the system successfully generates grounded mechanistic hypotheses for novel composite materials, such as linking cerium oxide to PCL scaffolds via chitosan intermediates. This work establishes a "teacherless" agentic reasoning system where hypergraph topology acts as a verifiable guardrail, accelerating scientific discovery by uncovering relationships obscured by traditional graph methods.

A new prior is proposed for learning representations of high-level concepts of the kind we manipulate with language. This prior can be combined with other priors in order to help disentangling abstract factors from each other. It is inspired by cognitive neuroscience theories of consciousness, seen as a bottleneck through which just a few elements, after having been selected by attention from a broader pool, are then broadcast and condition further processing, both in perception and decision-making. The set of recently selected elements one becomes aware of is seen as forming a low-dimensional conscious state. This conscious state is combining the few concepts constituting a conscious thought, i.e., what one is immediately conscious of at a particular moment. We claim that this architectural and information-processing constraint corresponds to assumptions about the joint distribution between high-level concepts. To the extent that these assumptions are generally true (and the form of natural language seems consistent with them), they can form a useful prior for representation learning. A low-dimensional thought or conscious state is analogous to a sentence: it involves only a few variables and yet can make a statement with very high probability of being true. This is consistent with a joint distribution (over high-level concepts) which has the form of a sparse factor graph, i.e., where the dependencies captured by each factor of the factor graph involve only very few variables while creating a strong dip in the overall energy function. The consciousness prior also makes it natural to map conscious states to natural language utterances or to express classical AI knowledge in a form similar to facts and rules, albeit capturing uncertainty as well as efficient search mechanisms implemented by attention mechanisms.

Depth-recurrence facilitates latent reasoning by sharing parameters across depths. However, prior work lacks combined FLOP-, parameter-, and memory-matched baselines, underutilizes depth-recurrence due to partially fixed layer stacks, and ignores the bottleneck of constant hidden-sizes that restricts many-step latent reasoning. To address this, we introduce a modular framework of depth-recurrent attention mixtures (Dreamer), combining sequence attention, depth attention, and sparse expert attention. It alleviates the hidden-size bottleneck through attention along depth, decouples scaling dimensions, and allows depth-recurrent models to scale efficiently and effectively. Across language reasoning benchmarks, our models require 2 to 8x fewer training tokens for the same accuracy as FLOP-, parameter-, and memory-matched SOTA, and outperform ca. 2x larger SOTA models with the same training tokens. We further present insights into knowledge usage across depths, e.g., showing 2 to 11x larger expert selection diversity than SOTA MoEs.

Looping, reusing a block of layers across depth, and depth growing, training shallow-to-deep models by duplicating middle layers, have both been linked to stronger reasoning, but their relationship remains unclear. We provide a mechanistic unification: looped and depth-grown models exhibit convergent depth-wise signatures, including increased reliance on late layers and recurring patterns aligned with the looped or grown block. These shared signatures support the view that their gains stem from a common form of iterative computation. Building on this connection, we show that the two techniques are adaptable and composable: applying inference-time looping to the middle blocks of a depth-grown model improves accuracy on some reasoning primitives by up to 2times, despite the model never being trained to loop. Both approaches also adapt better than the baseline when given more in-context examples or additional supervised fine-tuning data. Additionally, depth-grown models achieve the largest reasoning gains when using higher-quality, math-heavy cooldown mixtures, which can be further boosted by adapting a middle block to loop. Overall, our results position depth growth and looping as complementary, practical methods for inducing and scaling iterative computation to improve reasoning.

Advanced reasoning in large language models has achieved remarkable performance on challenging tasks, but the prevailing long-context reasoning paradigm faces critical limitations: quadratic computational scaling with sequence length, reasoning constrained by maximum context boundaries, and performance degradation beyond pre-training context windows. Existing approaches primarily compress reasoning chains without addressing the fundamental scaling problem. To overcome these challenges, we introduce InftyThink, a paradigm that transforms monolithic reasoning into an iterative process with intermediate summarization. By interleaving short reasoning segments with concise progress summaries, our approach enables unbounded reasoning depth while maintaining bounded computational costs. This creates a characteristic sawtooth memory pattern that significantly reduces computational complexity compared to traditional approaches. Furthermore, we develop a methodology for reconstructing long-context reasoning datasets into our iterative format, transforming OpenR1-Math into 333K training instances. Experiments across multiple model architectures demonstrate that our approach reduces computational costs while improving performance, with Qwen2.5-Math-7B showing 3-13% improvements across MATH500, AIME24, and GPQA_diamond benchmarks. Our work challenges the assumed trade-off between reasoning depth and computational efficiency, providing a more scalable approach to complex reasoning without architectural modifications.

Large reasoning models achieve strong performance by scaling inference-time chain-of-thought, but this paradigm suffers from quadratic cost, context length limits, and degraded reasoning due to lost-in-the-middle effects. Iterative reasoning mitigates these issues by periodically summarizing intermediate thoughts, yet existing methods rely on supervised learning or fixed heuristics and fail to optimize when to summarize, what to preserve, and how to resume reasoning. We propose InftyThink+, an end-to-end reinforcement learning framework that optimizes the entire iterative reasoning trajectory, building on model-controlled iteration boundaries and explicit summarization. InftyThink+ adopts a two-stage training scheme with supervised cold-start followed by trajectory-level reinforcement learning, enabling the model to learn strategic summarization and continuation decisions. Experiments on DeepSeek-R1-Distill-Qwen-1.5B show that InftyThink+ improves accuracy by 21% on AIME24 and outperforms conventional long chain-of-thought reinforcement learning by a clear margin, while also generalizing better to out-of-distribution benchmarks. Moreover, InftyThink+ significantly reduces inference latency and accelerates reinforcement learning training, demonstrating improved reasoning efficiency alongside stronger performance.

Recent years have witnessed meteoric progress in reasoning models: neural networks that generate intermediate reasoning traces (RTs) before producing a final output. Despite the rapid advancement, our understanding of how RTs support reasoning, and the limits of this paradigm, remain incomplete. To promote greater clarity, we introduce PITA: a novel large-scale dataset of over 23 million statements in propositional logic and their corresponding proofs. As a benchmark for robust reasoning, we focus on length generalization: if a model is trained to determine truth or falsity on statements with proofs up to fixed length, how well does it generalize to statements requiring longer proofs? We propose notions of (1) task depth and (2) task breadth, which measure respectively (1) the number of steps required to solve an example from a task and (2) the number of unique examples across a task. We vary these quantities across subsets of PITA, and find that RT models generalize well on broad and shallow subsets, while deteriorating on narrow and deep subsets relative to non-RT baselines. To determine whether our results are idiosyncratic to PITA or indicative of general phenomena, we compare our results to a simple synthetic task based on syllogisms. Our resulting theory suggests fundamental scalings that limit how well RT models perform on deep tasks, and highlights their generalization strengths on broad tasks. Our findings overall identify fundamental benefits and limitations inherent in using reasoning traces.

Chain-of-thought (CoT) reasoning has enabled transformer-based language models to excel at complex mathematics and multi-step planning. However, in standard decoder-only architectures, these reasoning steps are externalized in natural language, improving interpretability at the cost of efficiency. To capture reasoning that is not easily represented in words, many works have explored recurrent architectures that aim to internalize reasoning in latent space, potentially supporting latent CoT. In this paper, we investigate whether such reasoning structures emerge in Huginn-3.5B, a depth-recurrent Transformer that reuses layers at inference time without increasing parameter count. We examine the model's internal behavior on arithmetic tasks using a suite of probing techniques including the Logit Lens and Coda Lens. Our findings reveal limited evidence of interpretable latent CoT by tracking rank trajectories of final and intermediate result tokens. Furthermore, we uncover significant probing inconsistencies across recurrent blocks, where the interpretability of hidden states depends heavily on both the layer index and the decoding method. Finally, we empirically show that increasing recurrence depth yields only marginal gains and falls well short of models that explicitly externalize reasoning steps. The code is available at https://github.com/wenquanlu/huginn-latent-cot.

Large Reasoning Models (LRMs) have recently achieved strong mathematical and code reasoning performance through Reinforcement Learning (RL) post-training. However, we show that modern reasoning post-training induces an unintended exploration collapse: temperature-based sampling no longer increases pass@n accuracy. Empirically, the final-layer posterior of post-trained LRMs exhibit sharply reduced entropy, while the entropy of intermediate layers remains relatively high. Motivated by this entropy asymmetry, we propose Latent Exploration Decoding (LED), a depth-conditioned decoding strategy. LED aggregates intermediate posteriors via cumulative sum and selects depth configurations with maximal entropy as exploration candidates. Without additional training or parameters, LED consistently improves pass@1 and pass@16 accuracy by 0.61 and 1.03 percentage points across multiple reasoning benchmarks and models. Project page: https://GitHub.com/Xiaomi-Research/LED.

DeepSearch paradigms have become a core enabler for deep reasoning models, allowing them to invoke external search tools to access up-to-date, domain-specific knowledge beyond parametric boundaries, thereby enhancing the depth and factual reliability of reasoning. Building upon this foundation, recent advances in reinforcement learning (RL) have further empowered models to autonomously and strategically control search tool usage, optimizing when and how to query external knowledge sources. Yet, these RL-driven DeepSearch systems often reveal a see-saw trade-off between accuracy and efficiency-frequent tool invocations can improve factual correctness but lead to unnecessary computational overhead and diminished efficiency. To address this challenge, we propose LightSearcher, an efficient RL framework that incorporates textual experiential memory by learning contrastive reasoning trajectories to generate interpretable summaries of successful reasoning patterns. In addition, it employs an adaptive reward shaping mechanism that penalizes redundant tool calls only in correct-answer scenarios. This design effectively balances the inherent accuracy-efficiency trade-off in DeepSearch paradigms. Experiments on four multi-hop QA benchmarks show that LightSearcher maintains accuracy comparable to SOTA baseline ReSearch, while reducing search tool invocations by 39.6%, inference time by 48.6%, and token consumption by 21.2%, demonstrating its superior efficiency.

Large language models (LLMs) achieve remarkable fluency across linguistic and reasoning tasks but remain systematically prone to hallucination. Prevailing accounts attribute hallucinations to data gaps, limited context, or optimization errors. We argue instead that hallucination is a structural outcome of the transformer architecture. As coherence engines, transformers are compelled to produce fluent continuations, with self-attention simulating the relational structure of meaning but lacking the existential grounding of temporality, mood, and care that stabilizes human understanding. On this basis, we distinguish ontological hallucination, arising when continuations require disclosure of beings in world, and residual reasoning hallucination, where models mimic inference by recycling traces of human reasoning in text. We illustrate these patterns through case studies aligned with Heideggerian categories and an experiment across twelve LLMs showing how simulated "self-preservation" emerges under extended prompts. Our contribution is threefold: (1) a comparative account showing why existing explanations are insufficient; (2) a predictive taxonomy of hallucination linked to existential structures with proposed benchmarks; and (3) design directions toward "truth-constrained" architectures capable of withholding or deferring when disclosure is absent. We conclude that hallucination is not an incidental defect but a defining limit of transformer-based models, an outcome scaffolding can mask but never resolve.

Deduction, induction, and abduction are fundamental reasoning paradigms, core for human logical thinking. Although improving Large Language Model (LLM) reasoning has attracted significant research efforts, the extent to which the fundamental paradigms induce generalization has yet to be systematically explored. In this study, we shed light on how the interplay between these core paradigms influences LLMs' reasoning behavior. To this end, we first collect a new dataset of reasoning trajectories from symbolic tasks, each targeting one of the three fundamental paradigms, to abstract from concrete world knowledge. Then, we investigate effective ways for inducing these skills into LLMs. We experiment with a battery of methods including simple fine-tuning, and more complex approaches to increase model depth, or transform a dense model to a mixture-of-experts. We comprehensively evaluate induced models on realistic out-of-domain tasks, that are entirely formulated in natural language and contain real-world knowledge. Our results reveal that our approach yields strong generalizability with substantial performance gains (up to 14.60) across realistic tasks.

Humans have a powerful and mysterious capacity to reason. By working through a series of purely mental steps, we can make inferences we would not be capable of making directly -- despite the fact that we get no additional data from the world. Similarly, when large language models generate a series of intermediate steps (a chain of thought) before answering a question, they often produce better answers than they otherwise would. We investigate why and how chain-of-thought reasoning is useful in language models, testing the hypothesis that reasoning is effective when training data consists of local clusters of variables that influence each other strongly. These training conditions enable the chaining of accurate local inferences in order to estimate relationships between variables that were not seen together in training. We prove that there will exist a "reasoning gap", where reasoning through intermediate variables improves inference, for the simple case of an autoregressive density estimator trained on local samples from a chain-structured probabilistic model. We then test our hypothesis empirically in more complex models, training an autoregressive language model on samples from Bayes nets but only including a subset of variables in each sample. We test language models' ability to match conditional probabilities with and without intermediate reasoning steps, finding that intermediate steps are only helpful when the training data is locally structured with respect to dependencies between variables and that the combination of locally-structured observations and reasoning is much more data-efficient than training on all variables. Our results illustrate how the effectiveness of reasoning step by step is rooted in the local statistical structure of the training data.

Large Language Models have demonstrated remarkable capabilities across diverse tasks, yet they frequently generate hallucinations outputs that are fluent but factually incorrect or unsupported. We propose Counterfactual Probing, a novel approach for detecting and mitigating hallucinations in LLM outputs. Our method dynamically generates counterfactual statements that appear plausible but contain subtle factual errors, then evaluates the model's sensitivity to these perturbations. We hypothesize that genuine knowledge exhibits robustness to counterfactual variations, while hallucinated content shows inconsistent confidence patterns when confronted with plausible alternatives. Our comprehensive evaluation on TruthfulQA, factual statement datasets, and curated hallucination examples demonstrates that counterfactual probing achieves superior detection performance compared to baseline methods, while our adaptive mitigation strategies reduce hallucination scores by an average of 24.5%. The approach requires no model retraining and can be integrated into existing LLM pipelines as a realtime verification mechanism.

We explore uncertainty quantification in large language models (LLMs), with the goal to identify when uncertainty in responses given a query is large. We simultaneously consider both epistemic and aleatoric uncertainties, where the former comes from the lack of knowledge about the ground truth (such as about facts or the language), and the latter comes from irreducible randomness (such as multiple possible answers). In particular, we derive an information-theoretic metric that allows to reliably detect when only epistemic uncertainty is large, in which case the output of the model is unreliable. This condition can be computed based solely on the output of the model obtained simply by some special iterative prompting based on the previous responses. Such quantification, for instance, allows to detect hallucinations (cases when epistemic uncertainty is high) in both single- and multi-answer responses. This is in contrast to many standard uncertainty quantification strategies (such as thresholding the log-likelihood of a response) where hallucinations in the multi-answer case cannot be detected. We conduct a series of experiments which demonstrate the advantage of our formulation. Further, our investigations shed some light on how the probabilities assigned to a given output by an LLM can be amplified by iterative prompting, which might be of independent interest.

When a language model is fed a wrong answer, what happens inside the network? Current understanding treats truthfulness as a static property of individual-layer representations-a direction to be probed, a feature to be extracted. Less is known about the dynamics: how internal representations diverge across the full depth of the network when the model processes correct versus incorrect continuations. We introduce forced-completion probing, a method that presents identical queries with known correct and incorrect single-token continuations and tracks five geometric measurements across every layer of four decoder-only models(1.5B-13B parameters). We report three findings. First, correct and incorrect paths diverge through rotation, not rescaling: displacement vectors maintain near-identical magnitudes while their angular separation increases, meaning factual selection is encoded in direction on an approximate hypersphere. Second, the model does not passively fail on incorrect input-it actively suppresses the correct answer, driving internal probability away from the right token. Third, both phenomena are entirely absent below a parameter threshold and emerge at 1.6B, suggesting a phase transition in factual processing capability. These results show that factual constraint processing has a specific geometric character-rotational, not scalar; active, not passive-that is invisible to methods based on single-layer probes or magnitude comparisons.

Large Language Models (LLMs) have demonstrated impressive reasoning capabilities, especially when guided by explicit chain-of-thought (CoT) reasoning that verbalizes intermediate steps. While CoT improves both interpretability and accuracy, its dependence on natural language reasoning limits the model's expressive bandwidth. Latent reasoning tackles this bottleneck by performing multi-step inference entirely in the model's continuous hidden state, eliminating token-level supervision. To advance latent reasoning research, this survey provides a comprehensive overview of the emerging field of latent reasoning. We begin by examining the foundational role of neural network layers as the computational substrate for reasoning, highlighting how hierarchical representations support complex transformations. Next, we explore diverse latent reasoning methodologies, including activation-based recurrence, hidden state propagation, and fine-tuning strategies that compress or internalize explicit reasoning traces. Finally, we discuss advanced paradigms such as infinite-depth latent reasoning via masked diffusion models, which enable globally consistent and reversible reasoning processes. By unifying these perspectives, we aim to clarify the conceptual landscape of latent reasoning and chart future directions for research at the frontier of LLM cognition. An associated GitHub repository collecting the latest papers and repos is available at: https://github.com/multimodal-art-projection/LatentCoT-Horizon/.

Recent Large Reasoning Models (LRMs), such as DeepSeek-R1 and OpenAI o1, have demonstrated strong performance gains by scaling up the length of Chain-of-Thought (CoT) reasoning during inference. However, a growing concern lies in their tendency to produce excessively long reasoning traces, which are often filled with redundant content (e.g., repeated definitions), over-analysis of simple problems, and superficial exploration of multiple reasoning paths for harder tasks. This inefficiency introduces significant challenges for training, inference, and real-world deployment (e.g., in agent-based systems), where token economy is critical. In this survey, we provide a comprehensive overview of recent efforts aimed at improving reasoning efficiency in LRMs, with a particular focus on the unique challenges that arise in this new paradigm. We identify common patterns of inefficiency, examine methods proposed across the LRM lifecycle, i.e., from pretraining to inference, and discuss promising future directions for research. To support ongoing development, we also maintain a real-time GitHub repository tracking recent progress in the field. We hope this survey serves as a foundation for further exploration and inspires innovation in this rapidly evolving area.

This work presents a framework for assessing whether large language models (LLMs) encode more factual knowledge in their parameters than what they express in their outputs. While a few studies hint at this possibility, none has clearly defined or demonstrated this phenomenon. We first propose a formal definition of knowledge, quantifying it for a given question as the fraction of correct-incorrect answer pairs where the correct one is ranked higher. This gives rise to external and internal knowledge, depending on the information used to score individual answer candidates: either the model's observable token-level probabilities or its intermediate computations. Hidden knowledge arises when internal knowledge exceeds external knowledge. We then present a case study, applying this framework to three popular open-weights LLMs in a closed-book QA setup. Our results indicate that: (1) LLMs consistently encode more factual knowledge internally than what they express externally, with an average gap of 40%. (2) Surprisingly, some knowledge is so deeply hidden that a model can internally know an answer perfectly, yet fail to generate it even once, despite large-scale repeated sampling of 1,000 answers. This reveals fundamental limitations in the generation capabilities of LLMs, which (3) puts a practical constraint on scaling test-time compute via repeated answer sampling in closed-book QA: significant performance improvements remain inaccessible because some answers are practically never sampled, yet if they were, we would be guaranteed to rank them first.

Recent advances in Large Language Models (LLMs) have been driven by test-time compute scaling - a strategy that improves reasoning by generating longer, sequential thought processes. While effective, this approach encounters a significant bottleneck as computation increases, where further computation offers only marginal performance gains. We argue this ceiling is not an inherent limit of the model's capability but a flaw in the scaling strategy itself, a phenomenon we term "Tunnel Vision", where a model's imperfect initial steps lock it into a suboptimal reasoning path. To overcome this, we introduce a new scaling paradigm: native thought parallelism. We present ParaThinker, an end-to-end framework that trains an LLM to generate multiple, diverse reasoning paths in parallel and synthesize them into a superior final answer. By exploring different lines of thoughts simultaneously, ParaThinker effectively sidesteps the Tunnel Vision issue and unlocks the model's latent reasoning potential. Our approach demonstrates that scaling compute in parallel (width) is a more effective and efficient way to superior reasoning than simply scaling sequentially (depth). On challenging reasoning benchmarks, ParaThinker achieves substantial accuracy improvements over sequential LLMs (12.3% for 1.5B and 7.5% for 7B models on average with 8 parallel paths), while adding only negligible latency overhead (7.1%). This enables smaller models to surpass much larger counterparts and establishes parallel thinking as a critical, efficient dimension for scaling future LLMs.

While reasoning in LLMs plays a natural role in math, code generation, and multi-hop factual questions, its effect on simple, single-hop factual questions remains unclear. Such questions do not require step-by-step logical decomposition, making the utility of reasoning highly counterintuitive. Nevertheless, we find that enabling reasoning substantially expands the capability boundary of the model's parametric knowledge recall, unlocking correct answers that are otherwise effectively unreachable. Why does reasoning aid parametric knowledge recall when there are no complex reasoning steps to be done? To answer this, we design a series of hypothesis-driven controlled experiments, and identify two key driving mechanisms: (1) a computational buffer effect, where the model uses the generated reasoning tokens to perform latent computation independent of their semantic content; and (2) factual priming, where generating topically related facts acts as a semantic bridge that facilitates correct answer retrieval. Importantly, this latter generative self-retrieval mechanism carries inherent risks: we demonstrate that hallucinating intermediate facts during reasoning increases the likelihood of hallucinations in the final answer. Finally, we show that our insights can be harnessed to directly improve model accuracy by prioritizing reasoning trajectories that contain hallucination-free factual statements.

Reliable probability estimation is of crucial importance in many real-world applications where there is inherent (aleatoric) uncertainty. Probability-estimation models are trained on observed outcomes (e.g. whether it has rained or not, or whether a patient has died or not), because the ground-truth probabilities of the events of interest are typically unknown. The problem is therefore analogous to binary classification, with the difference that the objective is to estimate probabilities rather than predicting the specific outcome. This work investigates probability estimation from high-dimensional data using deep neural networks. There exist several methods to improve the probabilities generated by these models but they mostly focus on model (epistemic) uncertainty. For problems with inherent uncertainty, it is challenging to evaluate performance without access to ground-truth probabilities. To address this, we build a synthetic dataset to study and compare different computable metrics. We evaluate existing methods on the synthetic data as well as on three real-world probability estimation tasks, all of which involve inherent uncertainty: precipitation forecasting from radar images, predicting cancer patient survival from histopathology images, and predicting car crashes from dashcam videos. We also give a theoretical analysis of a model for high-dimensional probability estimation which reproduces several of the phenomena evinced in our experiments. Finally, we propose a new method for probability estimation using neural networks, which modifies the training process to promote output probabilities that are consistent with empirical probabilities computed from the data. The method outperforms existing approaches on most metrics on the simulated as well as real-world data.

The scaling of large language models (LLMs) emphasizes increasing depth, yet performance gains diminish with added layers. Prior work introduces the concept of "effective depth", arguing that deeper models fail to fully utilize their layers for meaningful computation. Building on this, we systematically study how effective depth varies with model scale, training type, and task difficulty. First, we analyze the model behavior of Qwen-2.5 family (1.5B-32B) and find that while the number of effective layers grows with model size, the effective depth ratio remains stable. Besides, comparisons between base and corresponding long-CoT models show no increase in effective depth, suggesting that improved reasoning stems from longer context rather than deeper per-token computation. Furthermore, evaluations across tasks of varying difficulty indicate that models do not dynamically use more layers for harder problems. Our results suggest that current LLMs underuse available depth across scales, training paradigms and tasks of varying difficulties, pointing out research opportunities on increasing the layer utilization rate of LLMs, model pruning, and early exiting. Our code is released at https://github.com/AheadOFpotato/what_affects_effective_depth.

The mechanism by which RL contributes to reasoning capabilities-whether it incentivizes the synthesis of new skills or merely amplifies existing behaviors-remains a subject of intense debate. In this work, we investigate this question through the lens of Complementary Reasoning, a complex task that requires integrating internal parametric knowledge with external contextual information. Using a controlled synthetic dataset of human biographies, we strictly decouple this ability into two atomic skills: Parametric Reasoning (relying on internal knowledge) and Contextual Reasoning (depending on external information). To rigorously assess capability boundaries, we evaluate generalization across three distinct levels of difficulty: I.I.D., Composition, and Zero-shot settings. We find that while SFT is sufficient for in-distribution performance, it struggles with O.O.D. generalization, particularly in Zero-shot settings where relational combinations are novel. Crucially, we identify the SFT Generalization Paradox: Models supervised solely on the composite task achieve near-perfect in-distribution accuracy but collapse on out-of-distribution generalization, indicating their reliance on rote memorization of path shortcuts. In contrast, we find that RL acts as a reasoning synthesizer rather than a probability amplifier. However, we uncover a strict atomic prerequisite: RL can only synthesize these complex strategies if the base model has first mastered the independent atomic skills (Parametric and Contextual) via SFT. These findings challenge the view of RL as a mere amplifier, suggesting that given sufficient atomic foundations, RL can actively synthesize complex reasoning strategies from learned primitives without explicit supervision on such complex strategies. This indicates that decoupled atomic training followed by RL offers a scalable path to generalization for complex reasoning tasks.

Large language models (LLMs) have shown significant potential in scientific disciplines such as biomedicine, particularly in hypothesis generation, where they can analyze vast literature, identify patterns, and suggest research directions. However, a key challenge lies in evaluating the truthfulness of generated hypotheses, as verifying their accuracy often requires substantial time and resources. Additionally, the hallucination problem in LLMs can lead to the generation of hypotheses that appear plausible but are ultimately incorrect, undermining their reliability. To facilitate the systematic study of these challenges, we introduce TruthHypo, a benchmark for assessing the capabilities of LLMs in generating truthful biomedical hypotheses, and KnowHD, a knowledge-based hallucination detector to evaluate how well hypotheses are grounded in existing knowledge. Our results show that LLMs struggle to generate truthful hypotheses. By analyzing hallucinations in reasoning steps, we demonstrate that the groundedness scores provided by KnowHD serve as an effective metric for filtering truthful hypotheses from the diverse outputs of LLMs. Human evaluations further validate the utility of KnowHD in identifying truthful hypotheses and accelerating scientific discovery. Our data and source code are available at https://github.com/Teddy-XiongGZ/TruthHypo.

The inference phase of Large Language Models (LLMs) is very expensive. An ideal inference stage of LLMs could utilize fewer computational resources while still maintaining its capabilities (e.g., generalization and in-context learning ability). In this paper, we try to answer the question, "During LLM inference, can we use shallow layers for easy instances; and deep layers for hard ones?" To answer this question, we first indicate that Not all Layers are Necessary during Inference by statistically analyzing the activated layers across tasks. Then, we propose a simple algorithm named AdaInfer to determine the inference termination moment based on the input instance adaptively. More importantly, AdaInfer does not alter LLM parameters and maintains generalizability across tasks. Experiments on well-known LLMs (i.e., Llama2 series and OPT) show that AdaInfer saves an average of 14.8% of computational resources, even up to 50% on sentiment tasks, while maintaining comparable performance. Additionally, this method is orthogonal to other model acceleration techniques, potentially boosting inference efficiency further.

Human reasoning often involves working over limited information to arrive at probabilistic conclusions. In its simplest form, this involves making an inference that is not strictly entailed by a premise, but rather only likely given the premise. While reasoning LLMs have demonstrated strong performance on logical and mathematical tasks, their behavior on such open-ended, non-deterministic inferences remains largely unexplored. We introduce ProbCOPA, a dataset of 210 handcrafted probabilistic inferences in English, each annotated for inference likelihood by 25--30 human participants. We find that human responses are graded and varied, revealing probabilistic judgments of the inferences in our dataset. Comparing these judgments with responses from eight state-of-the-art reasoning LLMs, we show that models consistently fail to produce human-like distributions. Finally, analyzing LLM reasoning chains, we find evidence of a common reasoning pattern used to evaluate such inferences. Our findings reveal persistent differences between humans and LLMs, and underscore the need to evaluate reasoning beyond deterministic settings.

Large language models (LLMs) face issues in handling factual knowledge, making it vital to evaluate their true ability to understand facts. In this study, we introduce knowledge probing frameworks, BELIEF(-ICL), to evaluate the knowledge understanding ability of not only encoder-based PLMs but also decoder-based PLMs from diverse perspectives. BELIEFs utilize a multi-prompt dataset to evaluate PLM's accuracy, consistency, and reliability in factual knowledge understanding. To provide a more reliable evaluation with BELIEFs, we semi-automatically create MyriadLAMA, which has more diverse prompts than existing datasets. We validate the effectiveness of BELIEFs in correctly and comprehensively evaluating PLM's factual understanding ability through extensive evaluations. We further investigate key factors in learning facts in LLMs, and reveal the limitation of the prompt-based knowledge probing. The dataset is anonymously publicized.

Inference, especially those derived from inductive processes, is a crucial component in our conversation to complement the information implicitly or explicitly conveyed by a speaker. While recent large language models show remarkable advances in inference tasks, their performance in inductive reasoning, where not all information is present in the context, is far behind deductive reasoning. In this paper, we analyze the behavior of the models based on the task difficulty defined by the semantic information gap -- which distinguishes inductive and deductive reasoning (Johnson-Laird, 1988, 1993). Our analysis reveals that the disparity in information between dialogue contexts and desired inferences poses a significant challenge to the inductive inference process. To mitigate this information gap, we investigate a contrastive learning approach by feeding negative samples. Our experiments suggest negative samples help models understand what is wrong and improve their inference generations.

Large Reasoning Models (LRMs) have shown impressive capabilities in multi-step reasoning tasks. However, alongside these successes, a more deceptive form of model error has emerged--Reasoning Hallucination--where logically coherent but factually incorrect reasoning traces lead to persuasive yet faulty conclusions. Unlike traditional hallucinations, these errors are embedded within structured reasoning, making them more difficult to detect and potentially more harmful. In this work, we investigate reasoning hallucinations from a mechanistic perspective. We propose the Reasoning Score, which quantifies the depth of reasoning by measuring the divergence between logits obtained from projecting late layers of LRMs to the vocabulary space, effectively distinguishing shallow pattern-matching from genuine deep reasoning. Using this score, we conduct an in-depth analysis on the ReTruthQA dataset and identify two key reasoning hallucination patterns: early-stage fluctuation in reasoning depth and incorrect backtracking to flawed prior steps. These insights motivate our Reasoning Hallucination Detection (RHD) framework, which achieves state-of-the-art performance across multiple domains. To mitigate reasoning hallucinations, we further introduce GRPO-R, an enhanced reinforcement learning algorithm that incorporates step-level deep reasoning rewards via potential-based shaping. Our theoretical analysis establishes stronger generalization guarantees, and experiments demonstrate improved reasoning quality and reduced hallucination rates.

Do larger and more capable language models learn to update their "beliefs" about propositions more consistently with Bayes' theorem when presented with evidence in-context? To test this, we formulate a Bayesian Coherence Coefficient (BCC) metric and generate a dataset with which to measure the BCC. We measure BCC for multiple pre-trained-only language models across five model families, comparing against the number of model parameters, the amount of training data, and model scores on common benchmarks. Our results provide evidence for our hypothesis that larger and more capable pre-trained language models assign credences that are more coherent with Bayes' theorem. These results have important implications for our understanding and governance of LLMs.

Large Language Models (LLMs) are prone to hallucination, the generation of plausible yet factually incorrect statements. This work investigates the intrinsic, architectural origins of this failure mode through three primary contributions.First, to enable the reliable tracing of internal semantic failures, we propose Distributional Semantics Tracing (DST), a unified framework that integrates established interpretability techniques to produce a causal map of a model's reasoning, treating meaning as a function of context (distributional semantics). Second, we pinpoint the model's layer at which a hallucination becomes inevitable, identifying a specific commitment layer where a model's internal representations irreversibly diverge from factuality. Third, we identify the underlying mechanism for these failures. We observe a conflict between distinct computational pathways, which we interpret using the lens of dual-process theory: a fast, heuristic associative pathway (akin to System 1) and a slow, deliberate contextual pathway (akin to System 2), leading to predictable failure modes such as Reasoning Shortcut Hijacks. Our framework's ability to quantify the coherence of the contextual pathway reveals a strong negative correlation (rho = -0.863) with hallucination rates, implying that these failures are predictable consequences of internal semantic weakness. The result is a mechanistic account of how, when, and why hallucinations occur within the Transformer architecture.

Hallucination remains a critical challenge in large language models (LLMs), hindering the development of reliable multimodal LLMs (MLLMs). Existing solutions often rely on human intervention or underutilize the agent's ability to autonomously mitigate hallucination. To address these limitations, we draw inspiration from how humans make reliable decisions in the real world. They begin with introspective reasoning to reduce uncertainty and form an initial judgment, then rely on external verification from diverse perspectives to reach a final decision. Motivated by this cognitive paradigm, we propose InEx, a training-free, multi-agent framework designed to autonomously mitigate hallucination. InEx introduces internal introspective reasoning, guided by entropy-based uncertainty estimation, to improve the reliability of the decision agent's reasoning process. The agent first generates a response, which is then iteratively verified and refined through external cross-modal multi-agent collaboration with the editing agent and self-reflection agents, further enhancing reliability and mitigating hallucination. Extensive experiments show that InEx consistently outperforms existing methods, achieving 4%-27% gains on general and hallucination benchmarks, and demonstrating strong robustness.

We often attribute human characteristics to large language models (LLMs) and claim that they "know" certain things. LLMs have an internal probabilistic knowledge that represents information retained during training. How can we assess the veracity of this knowledge? We examine two common methods for probing the veracity of LLMs and discover several assumptions that are flawed. To address these flawed assumptions, we introduce sAwMIL (short for Sparse Aware Multiple-Instance Learning), a probing method that utilizes the internal activations of LLMs to separate statements into true, false, and neither. sAwMIL is based on multiple-instance learning and conformal prediction. We evaluate sAwMIL on 5 validity criteria across 16 open-source LLMs, including both default and chat-based variants, as well as on 3 new datasets. Among the insights we provide are: (1) the veracity signal is often concentrated in the third quarter of an LLM's depth; (2) truth and falsehood signals are not always symmetric; (3) linear probes perform better on chat models than on default models; (4) nonlinear probes may be required to capture veracity signals for some LLMs with reinforcement learning from human feedback or knowledge distillation; and (5) LLMs capture a third type of signal that is distinct from true and false and is neither true nor false. These findings provide a reliable method for verifying what LLMs "know" and how certain they are of their probabilistic internal knowledge.

Recent advances in handling long sequences have facilitated the exploration of long-context in-context learning (ICL). While much of the existing research emphasizes performance improvements driven by additional in-context examples, the influence on the trustworthiness of generated responses remains underexplored. This paper addresses this gap by investigating how increased examples influence predictive uncertainty, an essential aspect in trustworthiness. We begin by systematically quantifying the uncertainty of ICL with varying shot counts, analyzing the impact of example quantity. Through uncertainty decomposition, we introduce a novel perspective on performance enhancement, with a focus on epistemic uncertainty (EU). Our results reveal that additional examples reduce total uncertainty in both simple and complex tasks by injecting task-specific knowledge, thereby diminishing EU and enhancing performance. For complex tasks, these advantages emerge only after addressing the increased noise and uncertainty associated with longer inputs. Finally, we explore the evolution of internal confidence across layers, unveiling the mechanisms driving the reduction in uncertainty.

Test-time scaling has emerged as an effective way to improve language models on challenging reasoning tasks. However, most existing methods treat each problem in isolation and do not systematically reuse knowledge from prior reasoning trajectories. In particular, they underutilize procedural knowledge: how to reframe a problem, choose an approach, and verify or backtrack when needed. We introduce Reasoning Memory, a retrieval-augmented generation (RAG) framework for reasoning models that explicitly retrieves and reuses procedural knowledge at scale. Starting from existing corpora of step-by-step reasoning trajectories, we decompose each trajectory into self-contained subquestion-subroutine pairs, yielding a datastore of 32 million compact procedural knowledge entries. At inference time, a lightweight in-thought prompt lets the model verbalize the core subquestion, retrieve relevant subroutines within its reasoning trace, and reason under diverse retrieved subroutines as implicit procedural priors. Across six math, science, and coding benchmarks, Reasoning Memory consistently outperforms RAG with document, trajectory, and template knowledge, as well as a compute-matched test-time scaling baseline. With a higher inference budget, it improves over no retrieval by up to 19.2% and over the strongest compute-matched baseline by 7.9% across task types. Ablation studies show that these gains come from two key factors: the broad procedural coverage of the source trajectories and our decomposition and retrieval design, which together enable effective extraction and reuse of procedural knowledge.

Large language models (LLMs) have majorly advanced NLP and AI, and next to their ability to perform a wide range of procedural tasks, a major success factor is their internalized factual knowledge. Since Petroni et al. (2019), analyzing this knowledge has gained attention. However, most approaches investigate one question at a time via modest-sized pre-defined samples, introducing an ``availability bias'' (Tversky&Kahnemann, 1973) that prevents the analysis of knowledge (or beliefs) of LLMs beyond the experimenter's predisposition. To address this challenge, we propose a novel methodology to comprehensively materialize an LLM's factual knowledge through recursive querying and result consolidation. Our approach is a milestone for LLM research, for the first time providing constructive insights into the scope and structure of LLM knowledge (or beliefs). As a prototype, we build GPTKB, a knowledge base (KB) comprising 101 million relational triples for over 2.9 million entities from GPT-4o-mini. We use GPTKB to exemplarily analyze GPT-4o-mini's factual knowledge in terms of scale, accuracy, bias, cutoff and consistency, at the same time. GPTKB is accessible at https://gptkb.org

Modern large language models (LLMs) employ various forms of logical inference, both implicitly and explicitly, when addressing reasoning tasks. Understanding how to optimally leverage these inference paradigms is critical for advancing LLMs' reasoning capabilities. This paper adopts an exploratory approach by introducing a controlled evaluation environment for analogical reasoning -- a fundamental cognitive task -- that is systematically parameterized across three dimensions: modality (textual, visual, symbolic), difficulty (easy, medium, hard), and task format (multiple-choice or free-text generation). We analyze the comparative dynamics of inductive, abductive, and deductive inference pipelines across these dimensions, and demonstrate that our findings generalize to broader in-context learning tasks. Additionally, we investigate advanced paradigms such as hypothesis selection, verification, and refinement, revealing their potential to scale up logical inference in LLM reasoning. This exploratory study provides a foundation for future research in enhancing LLM reasoning through systematic logical inference strategies.

Reasoning is central to a wide range of intellectual activities, and while the capabilities of large language models (LLMs) continue to advance, their performance in reasoning tasks remains limited. The processes and mechanisms underlying reasoning are not yet fully understood, but key elements include path exploration, selection of relevant knowledge, and multi-step inference. Problems are solved through the synthesis of these components. In this paper, we propose a benchmark that focuses on a specific aspect of reasoning ability: the direct evaluation of multi-step inference. To this end, we design a special reasoning task where multi-step inference is specifically focused by largely eliminating path exploration and implicit knowledge utilization. Our dataset comprises pairs of explicit instructions and corresponding questions, where the procedures necessary for solving the questions are entirely detailed within the instructions. This setup allows models to solve problems solely by following the provided directives. By constructing problems that require varying numbers of steps to solve and evaluating responses at each step, we enable a thorough assessment of state-of-the-art LLMs' ability to follow instructions. To ensure the robustness of our evaluation, we include multiple distinct tasks. Furthermore, by comparing accuracy across tasks, utilizing step-aware metrics, and applying separately defined measures of complexity, we conduct experiments that offer insights into the capabilities and limitations of LLMs in reasoning tasks. Our findings have significant implications for the development of LLMs and highlight areas for future research in advancing their reasoning abilities. Our dataset is available at https://huggingface.co/datasets/ifujisawa/procbench and code at https://github.com/ifujisawa/proc-bench.

Standard Transformers have a fixed computational depth, fundamentally limiting their ability to generalize to tasks requiring variable-depth reasoning, such as multi-hop graph traversal or nested logic. We propose a depth-recurrent Transformer that decouples computational depth from parameter count by iteratively applying a shared-weight Transformer block in latent space -- enabling the model to trade recurrence steps for deeper reasoning at inference time. Our architecture incorporates three mechanisms to make deep recurrence (20+ steps) stable: (1) a silent thinking objective that supervises only the final output, forcing genuine multi-step reasoning rather than intermediate heuristic shortcuts; (2) LayerScale initialization to protect fragile reasoning states from untrained layer noise; and (3) an identity-biased recurrence that creates a gradient highway across many steps. We evaluate on three compositional reasoning domains with decreasing inductive biases: graph reachability (strict adjacency masking), nested boolean logic (relative positioning), and unstructured relational text (where sequence position provides no structural hints). Across all tasks, we observe a clear computational frontier -- a boundary where performance transitions from chance to near-perfect as thinking steps scale with task complexity. Moreover, these tasks reveal qualitatively different generalization behaviors: precise but brittle (graph), approximate but robust (logic), and autonomous latent routing without structural hints (text). This progression illuminates how the interplay between a task-invariant recurrent reasoning core and task-specific perceptual interfaces shapes out-of-distribution (OOD) generalization, offering a mechanistic perspective on vertical chain-of-thought that complements the prevailing horizontal token-generation paradigm.

Recent advancements in reasoning with large language models (RLLMs), such as OpenAI-O1 and DeepSeek-R1, have demonstrated their impressive capabilities in complex domains like mathematics and coding. A central factor in their success lies in the application of long chain-of-thought (Long CoT) characteristics, which enhance reasoning abilities and enable the solution of intricate problems. However, despite these developments, a comprehensive survey on Long CoT is still lacking, limiting our understanding of its distinctions from traditional short chain-of-thought (Short CoT) and complicating ongoing debates on issues like "overthinking" and "test-time scaling." This survey seeks to fill this gap by offering a unified perspective on Long CoT. (1) We first distinguish Long CoT from Short CoT and introduce a novel taxonomy to categorize current reasoning paradigms. (2) Next, we explore the key characteristics of Long CoT: deep reasoning, extensive exploration, and feasible reflection, which enable models to handle more complex tasks and produce more efficient, coherent outcomes compared to the shallower Short CoT. (3) We then investigate key phenomena such as the emergence of Long CoT with these characteristics, including overthinking, and test-time scaling, offering insights into how these processes manifest in practice. (4) Finally, we identify significant research gaps and highlight promising future directions, including the integration of multi-modal reasoning, efficiency improvements, and enhanced knowledge frameworks. By providing a structured overview, this survey aims to inspire future research and further the development of logical reasoning in artificial intelligence.

Recently evolved large reasoning models (LRMs) show powerful performance in solving complex tasks with long chain-of-thought (CoT) reasoning capability. As these LRMs are mostly developed by post-training on formal reasoning tasks, whether they generalize the reasoning capability to help reduce hallucination in fact-seeking tasks remains unclear and debated. For instance, DeepSeek-R1 reports increased performance on SimpleQA, a fact-seeking benchmark, while OpenAI-o3 observes even severer hallucination. This discrepancy naturally raises the following research question: Are reasoning models more prone to hallucination? This paper addresses the question from three perspectives. (1) We first conduct a holistic evaluation for the hallucination in LRMs. Our analysis reveals that LRMs undergo a full post-training pipeline with cold start supervised fine-tuning (SFT) and verifiable reward RL generally alleviate their hallucination. In contrast, both distillation alone and RL training without cold start fine-tuning introduce more nuanced hallucinations. (2) To explore why different post-training pipelines alters the impact on hallucination in LRMs, we conduct behavior analysis. We characterize two critical cognitive behaviors that directly affect the factuality of a LRM: Flaw Repetition, where the surface-level reasoning attempts repeatedly follow the same underlying flawed logic, and Think-Answer Mismatch, where the final answer fails to faithfully match the previous CoT process. (3) Further, we investigate the mechanism behind the hallucination of LRMs from the perspective of model uncertainty. We find that increased hallucination of LRMs is usually associated with the misalignment between model uncertainty and factual accuracy. Our work provides an initial understanding of the hallucination in LRMs.

Given the intractably large size of the space of proofs, any model that is capable of general deductive reasoning must generalize to proofs of greater complexity. Recent studies have shown that large language models (LLMs) possess some abstract deductive reasoning ability given chain-of-thought prompts. However, they have primarily been tested on proofs using modus ponens or of a specific size, and from the same distribution as the in-context examples. To measure the general deductive reasoning ability of LLMs, we test on a broad set of deduction rules and measure their ability to generalize to more complex proofs from simpler demonstrations from multiple angles: depth-, width-, and compositional generalization. To facilitate systematic exploration, we construct a new synthetic and programmable reasoning dataset that enables control over deduction rules and proof complexity. Our experiments on four LLMs of various sizes and training objectives show that they are able to generalize to longer and compositional proofs. However, they require explicit demonstrations to produce hypothetical subproofs, specifically in proof by cases and proof by contradiction.

Large-scale pre-trained vision models are becoming increasingly prevalent, offering expressive and generalizable visual representations that benefit various downstream tasks. Recent studies on the emergent properties of these models have revealed their high-level geometric understanding, in particular in the context of depth perception. However, it remains unclear how depth perception arises in these models without explicit depth supervision provided during pre-training. To investigate this, we examine whether the monocular depth cues, similar to those used by the human visual system, emerge in these models. We introduce a new benchmark, DepthCues, designed to evaluate depth cue understanding, and present findings across 20 diverse and representative pre-trained vision models. Our analysis shows that human-like depth cues emerge in more recent larger models. We also explore enhancing depth perception in large vision models by fine-tuning on DepthCues, and find that even without dense depth supervision, this improves depth estimation. To support further research, our benchmark and evaluation code will be made publicly available for studying depth perception in vision models.

Recent advancements in natural language processing by large language models (LLMs), such as GPT-4, have been suggested to approach Artificial General Intelligence. And yet, it is still under dispute whether LLMs possess similar reasoning abilities to humans. This study evaluates GPT-4 and various other LLMs in judging the profoundness of mundane, motivational, and pseudo-profound statements. We found a significant statement-to-statement correlation between the LLMs and humans, irrespective of the type of statements and the prompting technique used. However, LLMs systematically overestimate the profoundness of nonsensical statements, with the exception of Tk-instruct, which uniquely underestimates the profoundness of statements. Only few-shot learning prompts, as opposed to chain-of-thought prompting, draw LLMs ratings closer to humans. Furthermore, this work provides insights into the potential biases induced by Reinforcement Learning from Human Feedback (RLHF), inducing an increase in the bias to overestimate the profoundness of statements.

Large reasoning models (LRMs) have recently demonstrated impressive capabilities in complex reasoning tasks by leveraging increased test-time computation and exhibiting behaviors reminiscent of human-like self-reflection. While LRMs show a clear capacity for valuable self-reflection, how this ability interacts with other model behaviors remains underexplored. We investigate this connection by analyzing verbalized confidence, how models articulate their certainty, as a lens into the nature of self-reflection in LRMs. We find that supervised fine-tuning on reasoning traces (i.e., distillation) and reinforcement learning can improve verbalized calibration in reasoning-intensive settings in a progressive, laddered fashion. However, our results also indicate that reasoning models may possess a diminished awareness of their own knowledge boundaries, as evidenced by significantly lower "I don't know" response rates on factuality benchmarks. Moreover, we examine the relationship between verbalized confidence and reasoning chains, finding that models tend to express higher confidence when providing shorter or less elaborate reasoning. Our findings highlight how reasoning-oriented training can enhance performance in reasoning-centric tasks while potentially incurring a "reasoning tax," a cost reflected in the model's reduced ability to accurately recognize the limits of its own knowledge in small-scale models. More broadly, our work showcases how this erosion of knowledge boundaries can compromise model faithfulness, as models grow more confident without a commensurate understanding of when they should abstain.

Deep iterative chain-of-thought (CoT) reasoning enables LLMs to tackle complex tasks by progressively activating relevant pre-trained knowledge. However, it faces challenges in ensuring continual improvement and determining a stopping criterion. In this paper, we investigate whether the relevant knowledge that contributes directly to solving the given question can be activated from the initial reasoning path, thus circumventing the need for iterative refinement. Our experiments reveal that increasing the diversity of initial reasoning paths can achieve comparable or superior performance, a concept we term breadth reasoning. However, existing breadth reasoning approaches, such as self-consistency, offer limited diversity. To address this limitation, we propose a simple yet effective method that enhances reasoning breadth by integrating contextual exploration with reduced sampling randomness. Extensive experiments demonstrate that our approach significantly outperforms deep iterative reasoning. Our code is provided in https://github.com/zongqianwu/breadth.

Test-time scaling increases inference-time computation by allowing models to generate long reasoning chains, and has shown strong performance across many domains. However, in this work, we show that this approach is not yet effective for knowledge-intensive tasks, where high factual accuracy and low hallucination rates are essential. We conduct a comprehensive evaluation of test-time scaling using 12 reasoning models on two knowledge-intensive benchmarks. Our results reveal that increasing test-time computation does not consistently improve accuracy and, in many cases, it even leads to more hallucinations. We then analyze how extended reasoning affects hallucination behavior. We find that reduced hallucinations often result from the model choosing to abstain after thinking more, rather than from improved factual recall. Conversely, for some models, longer reasoning encourages attempts on previously unanswered questions, many of which result in hallucinations. Case studies show that extended reasoning can induce confirmation bias, leading to overconfident hallucinations. Despite these limitations, we observe that compared to non-thinking, enabling thinking remains beneficial. Code and data are available at https://github.com/XuZhao0/tts-knowledge

Capturing complex user preferences from sparse behavioral sequences remains a fundamental challenge in sequential recommendation. Recent latent reasoning methods have shown promise by extending test-time computation through multi-step reasoning, yet they exclusively rely on depth-level scaling along a single trajectory, suffering from diminishing returns as reasoning depth increases. To address this limitation, we propose Parallel Latent Reasoning (PLR), a novel framework that pioneers width-level computational scaling by exploring multiple diverse reasoning trajectories simultaneously. PLR constructs parallel reasoning streams through learnable trigger tokens in continuous latent space, preserves diversity across streams via global reasoning regularization, and adaptively synthesizes multi-stream outputs through mixture-of-reasoning-streams aggregation. Extensive experiments on three real-world datasets demonstrate that PLR substantially outperforms state-of-the-art baselines while maintaining real-time inference efficiency. Theoretical analysis further validates the effectiveness of parallel reasoning in improving generalization capability. Our work opens new avenues for enhancing reasoning capacity in sequential recommendation beyond existing depth scaling.

Recent studies on transformer-based language models show that they can answer questions by reasoning over knowledge provided as part of the context (i.e., in-context reasoning). However, since the available knowledge is often not filtered for a particular question, in-context reasoning can be sensitive to distractor facts, additional content that is irrelevant to a question but that may be relevant for a different question (i.e., not necessarily random noise). In these situations, the model fails to distinguish the knowledge that is necessary to answer the question, leading to spurious reasoning and degraded performance. This reasoning failure contrasts with the model's apparent ability to distinguish its contextual knowledge from all the knowledge it has memorized during pre-training. Following this observation, we propose teaching the model to reason more robustly by folding the provided contextual knowledge into the model's parameters before presenting it with a question. Our method, RECKONING, is a bi-level learning algorithm that teaches language models to reason by updating their parametric knowledge through back-propagation, allowing them to then answer questions using the updated parameters. During training, the inner loop rapidly adapts a copy of the model weights to encode contextual knowledge into its parameters. In the outer loop, the model learns to use the updated weights to reproduce and answer reasoning questions about the memorized knowledge. Our experiments on two multi-hop reasoning datasets show that RECKONING's performance improves over the in-context reasoning baseline (by up to 4.5%). We also find that compared to in-context reasoning, RECKONING generalizes better to longer reasoning chains unseen during training, is more robust to distractors in the context, and is more computationally efficient when multiple questions are asked about the same knowledge.

In this work, we propose sequence-level certainty as a common theme over hallucination in Knowledge Grounded Dialogue Generation (KGDG). We explore the correlation between the level of hallucination and two types of sequence-level certainty: probabilistic certainty and semantic certainty. Empirical results reveal that a higher level of both types of sequence-level certainty in model responses is correlated with a lower level of hallucination. We further propose Certainty-based Response Ranking (CRR), a decoding-time hallucination mitigation method that ranks response candidates based on their sequence-level certainty and outputs the answer with the highest certainty level. Aligning with our definitions of sequence-level certainty, we design 2 types of CRR approaches: Probabilistic CRR (P-CRR) and Semantic CRR (S-CRR). P-CRR ranks individually sampled model responses using the arithmetic mean log-probability of the entire sequence. S-CRR approaches certainty estimation from meaning-space, and ranks model response candidates based on their semantic certainty level as measured by an entailment-based Agreement Score (AS). Through extensive experiments across 3 KGDG datasets, 3 decoding methods, and 4 different models, we validate the effectiveness of the CRR methods in reducing model hallucination.

While Large Language Models (LLMs) have emerged with remarkable capabilities in complex tasks through Chain-of-Thought reasoning, practical resource constraints have sparked interest in transferring these abilities to smaller models. However, achieving both domain performance and cross-domain generalization remains challenging. Existing approaches typically restrict students to following a single golden rationale and treat different reasoning paths independently. Due to distinct inductive biases and intrinsic preferences, alongside the student's evolving capacity and reasoning preferences during training, a teacher's "optimal" rationale could act as out-of-distribution noise. This misalignment leads to a degeneration of the student's latent reasoning distribution, causing suboptimal performance. To bridge this gap, we propose MIND, a capability-adaptive framework that transitions distillation from passive mimicry to active cognitive construction. We synthesize diverse teacher perspectives through a novel "Teaching Assistant" network. By employing a Feedback-Driven Inertia Calibration mechanism, this network utilizes inertia-filtered training loss to align supervision with the student's current adaptability, effectively enhancing performance while mitigating catastrophic forgetting. Extensive experiments demonstrate that MIND achieves state-of-the-art performance on both in-distribution and out-of-distribution benchmarks, and our sophisticated latent space analysis further confirms the mechanism of reasoning ability internalization.

Large language models (LLMs) have demonstrated remarkable performance across diverse tasks by encoding vast amounts of factual knowledge. However, they are still prone to hallucinations, generating incorrect or misleading information, often accompanied by high uncertainty. Existing methods for hallucination detection primarily focus on quantifying internal uncertainty, which arises from missing or conflicting knowledge within the model. However, hallucinations can also stem from external uncertainty, where ambiguous user queries lead to multiple possible interpretations. In this work, we introduce Semantic Volume, a novel mathematical measure for quantifying both external and internal uncertainty in LLMs. Our approach perturbs queries and responses, embeds them in a semantic space, and computes the determinant of the Gram matrix of the embedding vectors, capturing their dispersion as a measure of uncertainty. Our framework provides a generalizable and unsupervised uncertainty detection method without requiring white-box access to LLMs. We conduct extensive experiments on both external and internal uncertainty detection, demonstrating that our Semantic Volume method consistently outperforms existing baselines in both tasks. Additionally, we provide theoretical insights linking our measure to differential entropy, unifying and extending previous sampling-based uncertainty measures such as the semantic entropy. Semantic Volume is shown to be a robust and interpretable approach to improving the reliability of LLMs by systematically detecting uncertainty in both user queries and model responses.

Recent works have shown that layer pruning can compress large language models (LLMs) while retaining strong performance on classification benchmarks with little or no finetuning. However, existing pruning techniques often suffer severe degradation on generative reasoning tasks. Through a systematic study across multiple model families, we find that tasks requiring multi-step reasoning are particularly sensitive to depth reduction. Beyond surface-level text degeneration, we observe degradation of critical algorithmic capabilities, including arithmetic computation for mathematical reasoning and balanced parenthesis generation for code synthesis. Under realistic post-training constraints, without access to pretraining-scale data or compute, we evaluate a simple mitigation strategy based on supervised finetuning with Self-Generated Responses. This approach achieves strong recovery on classification tasks, retaining up to 90\% of baseline performance, and yields substantial gains of up to 20--30 percentage points on generative benchmarks compared to prior post-pruning techniques. Crucially, despite these gains, recovery for generative reasoning remains fundamentally limited relative to classification tasks and is viable primarily at lower pruning ratios. Overall, we characterize the practical limits of layer pruning for generative reasoning and provide guidance on when depth reduction can be applied effectively under constrained post-training regimes.

Although AI agents have demonstrated impressive capabilities in long-horizon reasoning, their reliability is severely hampered by the ``Spiral of Hallucination,'' where early epistemic errors propagate irreversibly. Existing methods face a dilemma: uncertainty quantification (UQ) methods typically act as passive sensors, only diagnosing risks without addressing them, while self-reflection mechanisms suffer from continuous or aimless corrections. To bridge this gap, we propose a unified Dual-Process Agentic UQ (AUQ) framework that transforms verbalized uncertainty into active, bi-directional control signals. Our architecture comprises two complementary mechanisms: System 1 (Uncertainty-Aware Memory, UAM), which implicitly propagates verbalized confidence and semantic explanations to prevent blind decision-making; and System 2 (Uncertainty-Aware Reflection, UAR), which utilizes these explanations as rational cues to trigger targeted inference-time resolution only when necessary. This enables the agent to balance efficient execution and deep deliberation dynamically. Extensive experiments on closed-loop benchmarks and open-ended deep research tasks demonstrate that our training-free approach achieves superior performance and trajectory-level calibration. We believe this principled framework AUQ represents a significant step towards reliable agents.

Reasoning is a core capability of large language models, yet understanding how they learn and perform multi-step reasoning remains an open problem. In this study, we explore how different architectures and training methods affect model multi-step reasoning capabilities within a cellular automata framework. By training on state sequences generated with random Boolean functions for random initial conditions to exclude memorization, we demonstrate that most neural architectures learn to abstract the underlying rules. While models achieve high accuracy in next-state prediction, their performance declines sharply if multi-step reasoning is required. We confirm that increasing model depth plays a crucial role for sequential computations. We demonstrate that an extension of the effective model depth with recurrence, memory, and test-time compute scaling substantially enhances reasoning capabilities.

Language models have made significant progress in generating coherent text and predicting next tokens based on input prompts. This study compares the next-token prediction performance of two well-known models: OpenAI's GPT-2 and Meta's Llama-2-7b-chat-hf on Theory of Mind (ToM) tasks. To evaluate their capabilities, we built a dataset from 10 short stories sourced from the Explore ToM Dataset. We enhanced these stories by programmatically inserting additional sentences (infills) using GPT-4, creating variations that introduce different levels of contextual complexity. This setup enables analysis of how increasing context affects model performance. We tested both models under four temperature settings (0.01, 0.5, 1.0, 2.0) and evaluated their ability to predict the next token across three reasoning levels. Zero-order reasoning involves tracking the state, either current (ground truth) or past (memory). First-order reasoning concerns understanding another's mental state (e.g., "Does Anne know the apple is salted?"). Second-order reasoning adds recursion (e.g., "Does Anne think that Charles knows the apple is salted?"). Our results show that adding more infill sentences slightly reduces prediction accuracy, as added context increases complexity and ambiguity. Llama-2 consistently outperforms GPT-2 in prediction accuracy, especially at lower temperatures, demonstrating greater confidence in selecting the most probable token. As reasoning complexity rises, model responses diverge more. Notably, GPT-2 and Llama-2 display greater variability in predictions during first- and second-order reasoning tasks. These findings illustrate how model architecture, temperature, and contextual complexity influence next-token prediction, contributing to a better understanding of the strengths and limitations of current language models.

Humans use introspection to evaluate their understanding through private internal states inaccessible to external observers. We investigate whether large language models possess similar privileged knowledge about answer correctness, information unavailable through external observation. We train correctness classifiers on question representations from both a model's own hidden states and external models, testing whether self-representations provide a performance advantage. On standard evaluation, we find no advantage: self-probes perform comparably to peer-model probes. We hypothesize this is due to high inter-model agreement of answer correctness. To isolate genuine privileged knowledge, we evaluate on disagreement subsets, where models produce conflicting predictions. Here, we discover domain-specific privileged knowledge: self-representations consistently outperform peer representations in factual knowledge tasks, but show no advantage in math reasoning. We further localize this domain asymmetry across model layers, finding that the factual advantage emerges progressively from early-to-mid layers onward, consistent with model-specific memory retrieval, while math reasoning shows no consistent advantage at any depth.

Stepwise inference protocols, such as scratchpads and chain-of-thought, help language models solve complex problems by decomposing them into a sequence of simpler subproblems. Despite the significant gain in performance achieved via these protocols, the underlying mechanisms of stepwise inference have remained elusive. To address this, we propose to study autoregressive Transformer models on a synthetic task that embodies the multi-step nature of problems where stepwise inference is generally most useful. Specifically, we define a graph navigation problem wherein a model is tasked with traversing a path from a start to a goal node on the graph. Despite is simplicity, we find we can empirically reproduce and analyze several phenomena observed at scale: (i) the stepwise inference reasoning gap, the cause of which we find in the structure of the training data; (ii) a diversity-accuracy tradeoff in model generations as sampling temperature varies; (iii) a simplicity bias in the model's output; and (iv) compositional generalization and a primacy bias with in-context exemplars. Overall, our work introduces a grounded, synthetic framework for studying stepwise inference and offers mechanistic hypotheses that can lay the foundation for a deeper understanding of this phenomenon.

Inspired by advances in LLMs, reasoning-enhanced sequential recommendation performs multi-step deliberation before making final predictions, unlocking greater potential for capturing user preferences. However, current methods are constrained by static reasoning trajectories that are ill-suited for the diverse complexity of user behaviors. They suffer from two key limitations: (1) a static reasoning direction, which uses flat supervision signals misaligned with human-like hierarchical reasoning, and (2) a fixed reasoning depth, which inefficiently applies the same computational effort to all users, regardless of pattern complexity. These rigidity lead to suboptimal performance and significant computational waste. To overcome these challenges, we propose DTRec, a novel and effective framework that explores the Dynamic reasoning Trajectory for Sequential Recommendation along both direction and depth. To guide the direction, we develop Hierarchical Process Supervision (HPS), which provides coarse-to-fine supervisory signals to emulate the natural, progressive refinement of human cognitive processes. To optimize the depth, we introduce the Adaptive Reasoning Halting (ARH) mechanism that dynamically adjusts the number of reasoning steps by jointly monitoring three indicators. Extensive experiments on three real-world datasets demonstrate the superiority of our approach, achieving up to a 24.5% performance improvement over strong baselines while simultaneously reducing computational cost by up to 41.6%.

Large Language Models deployed as question answering tools require robust calibration to avoid overconfidence. We systematically evaluate how reasoning capabilities and budget affect confidence assessment accuracy, using the ClimateX dataset (Lacombe et al., 2023) and expanding it to human and planetary health. Our key finding challenges the "test-time scaling" paradigm: while recent reasoning LLMs achieve 48.7% accuracy in assessing expert confidence, increasing reasoning budgets consistently impairs rather than improves calibration. Extended reasoning leads to systematic overconfidence that worsens with longer thinking budgets, producing diminishing and negative returns beyond modest computational investments. Conversely, search-augmented generation dramatically outperforms pure reasoning, achieving 89.3% accuracy by retrieving relevant evidence. Our results suggest that information access, rather than reasoning depth or inference budget, may be the critical bottleneck for improved confidence calibration of knowledge-intensive tasks.

Large Reasoning Models (LRMs) perform strongly in complex reasoning tasks via Chain-of-Thought (CoT) prompting, but often suffer from verbose outputs caused by redundant content, increasing computational overhead, and degrading user experience. Existing compression methods either operate post-hoc pruning, risking disruption to reasoning coherence, or rely on sampling-based selection, which fails to intervene effectively during generation. In this work, we introduce a confidence-guided perspective to explain the emergence of redundant reflection in LRMs, identifying two key patterns: Confidence Deficit, where the model reconsiders correct steps due to low internal confidence, and Termination Delay, where reasoning continues even after reaching a confident answer. Based on this analysis, we propose ConCISE (Confidence-guided Compression In Step-by-step Efficient Reasoning), a framework that simplifies reasoning chains by reinforcing the model's confidence during inference, thus preventing the generation of redundant reflection steps. It integrates Confidence Injection to stabilize intermediate steps and Early Stopping to terminate reasoning when confidence is sufficient. Extensive experiments demonstrate that fine-tuning LRMs on ConCISE-generated data yields significantly shorter outputs, reducing length by up to approximately 50% under SimPO, while maintaining high task accuracy. ConCISE consistently outperforms existing baselines across multiple reasoning benchmarks.

Inductive reasoning is an essential capability for large language models (LLMs) to achieve higher intelligence, which requires the model to generalize rules from observed facts and then apply them to unseen examples. We present MIRAGE, a synthetic dataset that addresses the limitations of previous work, specifically the lack of comprehensive evaluation and flexible test data. In it, we evaluate LLMs' capabilities in both the inductive and deductive stages, allowing for flexible variation in input distribution, task scenario, and task difficulty to analyze the factors influencing LLMs' inductive reasoning. Based on these multi-faceted evaluations, we demonstrate that the LLM is a poor rule-based reasoner. In many cases, when conducting inductive reasoning, they do not rely on a correct rule to answer the unseen case. From the perspectives of different prompting methods, observation numbers, and task forms, models tend to consistently conduct correct deduction without correct inductive rules. Besides, we find that LLMs are good neighbor-based reasoners. In the inductive reasoning process, the model tends to focus on observed facts that are close to the current test example in feature space. By leveraging these similar examples, the model maintains strong inductive capabilities within a localized region, significantly improving its deductive performance.

Most efforts to improve the reasoning capabilities of large language models (LLMs) involve either scaling the number of parameters and the size of training data, or scaling inference computation by letting models generate complex chains of thought. Motivated by interpretability studies showing that the crucial computation required for reasoning tasks is concentrated in a limited range of layers, we introduce Encode-Think-Decode (ETD), a method that enhances the reasoning capabilities of a base model by training it to iterate over a small subset of reasoning-relevant layers during the mid-training stage. ETD amplifies latent reasoning while preserving the original architecture, parameter count, hyperparameters, and training data composition. When iterating on the selected layers at inference time, ETD models yield substantial gains on 17 reasoning benchmarks, including +28.4% relative accuracy improvement on GSM8K and +36% on MATH with the OLMo-2 1B Base model. We also explore an adaptive depth strategy that adjusts the computation per input token. Our results show that recursive latent reasoning offers a simple and effective path to stronger LLM reasoning.

Despite improvements in performances on different natural language generation tasks, deep neural models are prone to hallucinating facts that are incorrect or nonexistent. Different hypotheses are proposed and examined separately for different tasks, but no systematic explanations are available across these tasks. In this study, we draw connections between hallucinations and predictive uncertainty in conditional language generation. We investigate their relationship in both image captioning and data-to-text generation and propose a simple extension to beam search to reduce hallucination. Our analysis shows that higher predictive uncertainty corresponds to a higher chance of hallucination. Epistemic uncertainty is more indicative of hallucination than aleatoric or total uncertainties. It helps to achieve better results of trading performance in standard metric for less hallucination with the proposed beam search variant.

Recent advancements in large language models have showcased their remarkable generalizability across various domains. However, their reasoning abilities still have significant room for improvement, especially when confronted with scenarios requiring multi-step reasoning. Although large language models possess extensive knowledge, their behavior, particularly in terms of reasoning, often fails to effectively utilize this knowledge to establish a coherent thinking paradigm. Generative language models sometimes show hallucinations as their reasoning procedures are unconstrained by logical principles. Aiming to improve the zero-shot chain-of-thought reasoning ability of large language models, we propose Logical Chain-of-Thought (LogiCoT), a neurosymbolic framework that leverages principles from symbolic logic to verify and revise the reasoning processes accordingly. Experimental evaluations conducted on language tasks in diverse domains, including arithmetic, commonsense, symbolic, causal inference, and social problems, demonstrate the efficacy of the enhanced reasoning paradigm by logic.

Large Language Models (LLMs) often generate outputs that lack grounding in real-world facts, a phenomenon known as hallucinations. Prior research has associated hallucinations with model uncertainty, leveraging this relationship for hallucination detection and mitigation. In this paper, we challenge the underlying assumption that all hallucinations are associated with uncertainty. Using knowledge detection and uncertainty measurement methods, we demonstrate that models can hallucinate with high certainty even when they have the correct knowledge. We further show that high-certainty hallucinations are consistent across models and datasets, distinctive enough to be singled out, and challenge existing mitigation methods. Our findings reveal an overlooked aspect of hallucinations, emphasizing the need to understand their origins and improve mitigation strategies to enhance LLM safety. The code is available at https://github.com/technion-cs-nlp/Trust_me_Im_wrong .

Large language models (LLMs) continually evolve through pre-training on ever-expanding web data, but this adaptive process also exposes them to subtle forms of misinformation. While prior work has explored data poisoning during static pre-training, the effects of such manipulations under continual pre-training remain largely unexplored. Drawing inspiration from the illusory truth effect in human cognition - where repeated exposure to falsehoods increases belief in their accuracy - we ask whether LLMs exhibit a similar vulnerability. We investigate whether repeated exposure to false but confidently stated facts can shift a model's internal representation away from the truth. We introduce Layer of Truth, a framework and dataset for probing belief dynamics in continually trained LLMs. By injecting controlled amounts of poisoned data and probing intermediate representations across checkpoints, model scales, and question types, we quantify when and how factual beliefs shift. Our findings reveal that even minimal exposure can induce persistent representational drift in well-established facts, with susceptibility varying across layers and model sizes. These results highlight an overlooked vulnerability of continually updated LLMs: their capacity to internalize misinformation analogously to humans, underscoring the need for robust monitoring of factual integrity during model updates.

Language models can store vast amounts of factual knowledge, but their ability to use this knowledge for logical reasoning remains questionable. This paper explores a language model's ability to manipulate its stored knowledge during inference. We focus on four manipulation types: retrieval (e.g., "What is person A's attribute X"), classification (e.g., "Is A's attribute X even or odd?"), comparison (e.g., "Is A greater than B in attribute X?") and inverse search (e.g., "Which person's attribute X equals T?") We observe that pre-trained language models like GPT2/3/4 excel in knowledge retrieval but struggle with simple classification or comparison tasks unless Chain of Thoughts (CoTs) are employed during both training and inference. They also perform poorly in inverse knowledge search, irrespective of the prompts. Our primary contribution is a synthetic dataset for a controlled experiment that confirms these inherent weaknesses: a language model cannot efficiently manipulate knowledge from pre-training data, even when such knowledge is perfectly stored and fully extractable in the models, and despite adequate instruct fine-tuning.

Can we teach Large Language Models (LLMs) to refrain from hallucinating factual statements? In this paper we present a fine-tuning strategy that we call ConfQA, which can reduce hallucination rate from 20-40% to under 5% across multiple factuality benchmarks. The core idea is simple: when the LLM answers a question correctly, it is trained to continue with the answer; otherwise, it is trained to admit "I am unsure". But there are two key factors that make the training highly effective. First, we introduce a dampening prompt "answer only if you are confident" to explicitly guide the behavior, without which hallucination remains high as 15%-25%. Second, we leverage simple factual statements, specifically attribute values from knowledge graphs, to help LLMs calibrate the confidence, resulting in robust generalization across domains and question types. Building on this insight, we propose the Dual Neural Knowledge framework, which seamlessly select between internally parameterized neural knowledge and externally recorded symbolic knowledge based on ConfQA's confidence. The framework enables potential accuracy gains to beyond 95%, while reducing unnecessary external retrievals by over 30%.

Natural language inference (NLI) is an increasingly important task for natural language understanding, which requires one to infer whether a sentence entails another. However, the ability of NLI models to make pragmatic inferences remains understudied. We create an IMPlicature and PRESupposition diagnostic dataset (IMPPRES), consisting of >25k semiautomatically generated sentence pairs illustrating well-studied pragmatic inference types. We use IMPPRES to evaluate whether BERT, InferSent, and BOW NLI models trained on MultiNLI (Williams et al., 2018) learn to make pragmatic inferences. Although MultiNLI appears to contain very few pairs illustrating these inference types, we find that BERT learns to draw pragmatic inferences. It reliably treats scalar implicatures triggered by "some" as entailments. For some presupposition triggers like "only", BERT reliably recognizes the presupposition as an entailment, even when the trigger is embedded under an entailment canceling operator like negation. BOW and InferSent show weaker evidence of pragmatic reasoning. We conclude that NLI training encourages models to learn some, but not all, pragmatic inferences.

Current large vision-language models (LVLMs) achieve remarkable progress, yet there remains significant uncertainty regarding their ability to accurately apprehend visual details, that is, in performing detailed captioning. To address this, we introduce CCEval, a GPT-4 assisted evaluation method tailored for detailed captioning. Interestingly, while LVLMs demonstrate minimal object existence hallucination in existing VQA benchmarks, our proposed evaluation reveals continued susceptibility to such hallucinations. In this paper, we make the first attempt to investigate and attribute such hallucinations, including image resolution, the language decoder size, and instruction data amount, quality, granularity. Our findings underscore the unwarranted inference when the language description includes details at a finer object granularity than what the vision module can ground or verify, thus inducing hallucination. To control such hallucinations, we further attribute the reliability of captioning to contextual knowledge (involving only contextually grounded objects) and parametric knowledge (containing inferred objects by the model). Thus, we introduce HallE-Switch, a controllable LVLM in terms of Hallucination in object Existence. HallE-Switch can condition the captioning to shift between (i) exclusively depicting contextual knowledge for grounded objects and (ii) blending it with parametric knowledge to imagine inferred objects. Our method reduces hallucination by 44% compared to LLaVA_{7B} and maintains the same object coverage.

As Large Language Models become more ubiquitous across domains, it becomes important to examine their inherent limitations critically. This work argues that hallucinations in language models are not just occasional errors but an inevitable feature of these systems. We demonstrate that hallucinations stem from the fundamental mathematical and logical structure of LLMs. It is, therefore, impossible to eliminate them through architectural improvements, dataset enhancements, or fact-checking mechanisms. Our analysis draws on computational theory and Godel's First Incompleteness Theorem, which references the undecidability of problems like the Halting, Emptiness, and Acceptance Problems. We demonstrate that every stage of the LLM process-from training data compilation to fact retrieval, intent classification, and text generation-will have a non-zero probability of producing hallucinations. This work introduces the concept of Structural Hallucination as an intrinsic nature of these systems. By establishing the mathematical certainty of hallucinations, we challenge the prevailing notion that they can be fully mitigated.

Transformers demonstrate impressive performance on a range of reasoning benchmarks. To evaluate the degree to which these abilities are a result of actual reasoning, existing work has focused on developing sophisticated benchmarks for behavioral studies. However, these studies do not provide insights into the internal mechanisms driving the observed capabilities. To improve our understanding of the internal mechanisms of transformers, we present a comprehensive mechanistic analysis of a transformer trained on a synthetic reasoning task. We identify a set of interpretable mechanisms the model uses to solve the task, and validate our findings using correlational and causal evidence. Our results suggest that it implements a depth-bounded recurrent mechanisms that operates in parallel and stores intermediate results in selected token positions. We anticipate that the motifs we identified in our synthetic setting can provide valuable insights into the broader operating principles of transformers and thus provide a basis for understanding more complex models.

Epistemic Uncertainty is a measure of the lack of knowledge of a learner which diminishes with more evidence. While existing work focuses on using the variance of the Bayesian posterior due to parameter uncertainty as a measure of epistemic uncertainty, we argue that this does not capture the part of lack of knowledge induced by model misspecification. We discuss how the excess risk, which is the gap between the generalization error of a predictor and the Bayes predictor, is a sound measure of epistemic uncertainty which captures the effect of model misspecification. We thus propose a principled framework for directly estimating the excess risk by learning a secondary predictor for the generalization error and subtracting an estimate of aleatoric uncertainty, i.e., intrinsic unpredictability. We discuss the merits of this novel measure of epistemic uncertainty, and highlight how it differs from variance-based measures of epistemic uncertainty and addresses its major pitfall. Our framework, Direct Epistemic Uncertainty Prediction (DEUP) is particularly interesting in interactive learning environments, where the learner is allowed to acquire novel examples in each round. Through a wide set of experiments, we illustrate how existing methods in sequential model optimization can be improved with epistemic uncertainty estimates from DEUP, and how DEUP can be used to drive exploration in reinforcement learning. We also evaluate the quality of uncertainty estimates from DEUP for probabilistic image classification and predicting synergies of drug combinations.

Test-time compute has emerged as a powerful paradigm for improving the performance of large language models (LLMs), where generating multiple outputs or refining individual chains can significantly boost answer accuracy. However, existing methods like Best-of-N, majority voting, and self-reflection typically apply reasoning in a uniform way across inputs, overlooking the fact that different problems may require different levels of reasoning depth. In this work, we propose Fractional Reasoning, a training-free and model-agnostic framework that enables continuous control over reasoning intensity at inference time, going beyond the limitations of fixed instructional prompts. Our method operates by extracting the latent steering vector associated with deeper reasoning and reapplying it with a tunable scaling factor, allowing the model to tailor its reasoning process to the complexity of each input. This supports two key modes of test-time scaling: (1) improving output quality in breadth-based strategies (e.g., Best-of-N, majority voting), and (2) enhancing the correctness of individual reasoning chains in depth-based strategies (e.g., self-reflection). Experiments on GSM8K, MATH500, and GPQA demonstrate that Fractional Reasoning consistently improves performance across diverse reasoning tasks and models.

We investigate whether large language models can introspect on their internal states. It is difficult to answer this question through conversation alone, as genuine introspection cannot be distinguished from confabulations. Here, we address this challenge by injecting representations of known concepts into a model's activations, and measuring the influence of these manipulations on the model's self-reported states. We find that models can, in certain scenarios, notice the presence of injected concepts and accurately identify them. Models demonstrate some ability to recall prior internal representations and distinguish them from raw text inputs. Strikingly, we find that some models can use their ability to recall prior intentions in order to distinguish their own outputs from artificial prefills. In all these experiments, Claude Opus 4 and 4.1, the most capable models we tested, generally demonstrate the greatest introspective awareness; however, trends across models are complex and sensitive to post-training strategies. Finally, we explore whether models can explicitly control their internal representations, finding that models can modulate their activations when instructed or incentivized to "think about" a concept. Overall, our results indicate that current language models possess some functional introspective awareness of their own internal states. We stress that in today's models, this capacity is highly unreliable and context-dependent; however, it may continue to develop with further improvements to model capabilities.

Recent language models have a mysterious tendency to generate false but plausible-sounding text. Such "hallucinations" are an obstacle to the usability of language-based AI systems and can harm people who rely upon their outputs. This work shows shows that there is an inherent statistical reason that pretrained language models hallucinate certain types of facts, having nothing to do with the transformer LM architecture or data quality. For "arbitrary" facts whose veracity cannot be determined from the training data, we show that hallucination is necessary for language models that satisfy a statistical calibration condition appropriate for generative language models. Specifically, if the maximum probability of any fact is bounded, we show that the probability of generating a hallucination is close to the fraction of facts that occur exactly once in the training data (a "Good-Turing" estimate), even assuming ideal training data without errors. One conclusion is that models pretrained to be sufficiently good predictors (i.e., calibrated) may require post-training to mitigate hallucinations on the type of arbitrary facts that tend to appear once in the training set. However, our analysis also suggests that there is no statistical reason that pretraining will lead to hallucination on facts that tend to appear more than once in the training data (like references to publications such as articles and books, whose hallucinations have been particularly notable and problematic) or on systematic facts (like arithmetic calculations). Therefore, different architectures and learning algorithms may mitigate these latter types of hallucinations.

Large Language Models (LLMs) with chains-of-thought have demonstrated strong performance on an increasing range of tasks, particularly those involving complex logical reasoning. However, excessively long chains can lead to overthinking, causing computational waste and slower responses. This raises a question: can LLMs dynamically adjust the length of their reasoning processes based on task complexity? To address this, we propose the Think in Blocks framework, which enables adaptive reasoning-from zero to deep reasoning-by partitioning the reasoning process into a tunable number of blocks. Our main contributions are: (1) Establishing an explicit block-structured paradigm in which the model first predicts an integer reasoning budget-the number of blocks-and then partitions its reasoning accordingly; (2) Training an adaptive model through a three-stage pipeline-Supervised Fine-Tuning, reward-guided Direct Preference Optimization, and Reinforcement Learning-that adjusts its reasoning depth to problem difficulty; (3) Exploiting the explicit block count to dynamically control reasoning depth at inference time, allowing flexible adjustment of chain-of-thought length during deployment.

We provide evidence of performative chain-of-thought (CoT) in reasoning models, where a model becomes strongly confident in its final answer, but continues generating tokens without revealing its internal belief. Our analysis compares activation probing, early forced answering, and a CoT monitor across two large models (DeepSeek-R1 671B & GPT-OSS 120B) and find task difficulty-specific differences: The model's final answer is decodable from activations far earlier in CoT than a monitor is able to say, especially for easy recall-based MMLU questions. We contrast this with genuine reasoning in difficult multihop GPQA-Diamond questions. Despite this, inflection points (e.g., backtracking, 'aha' moments) occur almost exclusively in responses where probes show large belief shifts, suggesting these behaviors track genuine uncertainty rather than learned "reasoning theater." Finally, probe-guided early exit reduces tokens by up to 80% on MMLU and 30% on GPQA-Diamond with similar accuracy, positioning attention probing as an efficient tool for detecting performative reasoning and enabling adaptive computation.

Chain-of-thought reasoning, while powerful, can produce unnecessarily verbose output for simpler problems. We present a framework for difficulty-aware reasoning that teaches models to dynamically adjust reasoning depth based on problem complexity. Remarkably, we show that models can be endowed with such dynamic inference pathways without any architectural modifications; we simply post-train on data that is carefully curated to include chain-of-thought traces that are proportional in length to problem difficulty. Our analysis reveals that post-training via supervised fine-tuning (SFT) primarily captures patterns like reasoning length and format, while direct preference optimization (DPO) preserves reasoning accuracy, with their combination reducing length and maintaining or improving performance. Both quantitative metrics and qualitative assessments confirm that models can learn to "think proportionally", reasoning minimally on simple problems while maintaining depth for complex ones.

Large language models (LLMs) are restricted to reason in the "language space", where they typically express the reasoning process with a chain-of-thought (CoT) to solve a complex reasoning problem. However, we argue that language space may not always be optimal for reasoning. For example, most word tokens are primarily for textual coherence and not essential for reasoning, while some critical tokens require complex planning and pose huge challenges to LLMs. To explore the potential of LLM reasoning in an unrestricted latent space instead of using natural language, we introduce a new paradigm Coconut (Chain of Continuous Thought). We utilize the last hidden state of the LLM as a representation of the reasoning state (termed "continuous thought"). Rather than decoding this into a word token, we feed it back to the LLM as the subsequent input embedding directly in the continuous space. Experiments show that Coconut can effectively augment the LLM on several reasoning tasks. This novel latent reasoning paradigm leads to emergent advanced reasoning patterns: the continuous thought can encode multiple alternative next reasoning steps, allowing the model to perform a breadth-first search (BFS) to solve the problem, rather than prematurely committing to a single deterministic path like CoT. Coconut outperforms CoT in certain logical reasoning tasks that require substantial backtracking during planning, with fewer thinking tokens during inference. These findings demonstrate the promise of latent reasoning and offer valuable insights for future research.

Investigating the reasoning abilities of transformer models, and discovering new challenging tasks for them, has been a topic of much interest. Recent studies have found these models to be surprisingly strong at performing deductive reasoning over formal logical theories expressed in natural language. A shortcoming of these studies, however, is that they do not take into account that logical theories, when sampled uniformly at random, do not necessarily lead to hard instances. We propose a new methodology for creating challenging algorithmic reasoning datasets that focus on natural language satisfiability (NLSat) problems. The key idea is to draw insights from empirical sampling of hard propositional SAT problems and from complexity-theoretic studies of language. This methodology allows us to distinguish easy from hard instances, and to systematically increase the complexity of existing reasoning benchmarks such as RuleTaker. We find that current transformers, given sufficient training data, are surprisingly robust at solving the resulting NLSat problems of substantially increased difficulty. They also exhibit some degree of scale-invariance - the ability to generalize to problems of larger size and scope. Our results, however, reveal important limitations too: a careful sampling of training data is crucial for building models that generalize to larger problems, and transformer models' limited scale-invariance suggests they are far from learning robust deductive reasoning algorithms.

Large Language Models (LLMs) have shown impressive capabilities but still suffer from the issue of hallucinations. A significant type of this issue is the false premise hallucination, which we define as the phenomenon when LLMs generate hallucinated text when confronted with false premise questions. In this paper, we perform a comprehensive analysis of the false premise hallucination and elucidate its internal working mechanism: a small subset of attention heads (which we designate as false premise heads) disturb the knowledge extraction process, leading to the occurrence of false premise hallucination. Based on our analysis, we propose FAITH (False premise Attention head constraIining for miTigating Hallucinations), a novel and effective method to mitigate false premise hallucinations. It constrains the false premise attention heads during the model inference process. Impressively, extensive experiments demonstrate that constraining only approximately 1% of the attention heads in the model yields a notable increase of nearly 20% of model performance.

Large reasoning models (LRMs) like OpenAI-o1 and DeepSeek-R1 have demonstrated remarkable capabilities in complex reasoning tasks through the utilization of long Chain-of-thought (CoT). However, these models often suffer from hallucinations and inefficiencies due to their reliance solely on internal reasoning processes. In this paper, we introduce START (Self-Taught Reasoner with Tools), a novel tool-integrated long CoT reasoning LLM that significantly enhances reasoning capabilities by leveraging external tools. Through code execution, START is capable of performing complex computations, self-checking, exploring diverse methods, and self-debugging, thereby addressing the limitations of LRMs. The core innovation of START lies in its self-learning framework, which comprises two key techniques: 1) Hint-infer: We demonstrate that inserting artificially designed hints (e.g., ``Wait, maybe using Python here is a good idea.'') during the inference process of a LRM effectively stimulates its ability to utilize external tools without the need for any demonstration data. Hint-infer can also serve as a simple and effective sequential test-time scaling method; 2) Hint Rejection Sampling Fine-Tuning (Hint-RFT): Hint-RFT combines Hint-infer and RFT by scoring, filtering, and modifying the reasoning trajectories with tool invocation generated by a LRM via Hint-infer, followed by fine-tuning the LRM. Through this framework, we have fine-tuned the QwQ-32B model to achieve START. On PhD-level science QA (GPQA), competition-level math benchmarks (AMC23, AIME24, AIME25), and the competition-level code benchmark (LiveCodeBench), START achieves accuracy rates of 63.6%, 95.0%, 66.7%, 47.1%, and 47.3%, respectively. It significantly outperforms the base QwQ-32B and achieves performance comparable to the state-of-the-art open-weight model R1-Distill-Qwen-32B and the proprietary model o1-Preview.

Large language models (LLMs) are susceptible to hallucinations-outputs that are ungrounded, factually incorrect, or inconsistent with prior generations. We focus on close-book Question Answering (CBQA), where previous work has not fully addressed the distinction between two possible kinds of hallucinations, namely, whether the model (1) does not hold the correct answer in its parameters or (2) answers incorrectly despite having the required knowledge. We argue that distinguishing these cases is crucial for detecting and mitigating hallucinations. Specifically, case (2) may be mitigated by intervening in the model's internal computation, as the knowledge resides within the model's parameters. In contrast, in case (1) there is no parametric knowledge to leverage for mitigation, so it should be addressed by resorting to an external knowledge source or abstaining. To help distinguish between the two cases, we introduce Wrong Answer despite having Correct Knowledge (WACK), an approach for constructing model-specific datasets for the second hallucination type. Our probing experiments indicate that the two kinds of hallucinations are represented differently in the model's inner states. Next, we show that datasets constructed using WACK exhibit variations across models, demonstrating that even when models share knowledge of certain facts, they still vary in the specific examples that lead to hallucinations. Finally, we show that training a probe on our WACK datasets leads to better hallucination detection of case (2) hallucinations than using the common generic one-size-fits-all datasets. The code is available at https://github.com/technion-cs-nlp/hallucination-mitigation .

Large Language Model (LLM) hallucinations are usually treated as defects of the model or its decoding strategy. Drawing on classical linguistics, we argue that a query's form can also shape a listener's (and model's) response. We operationalize this insight by constructing a 22-dimension query feature vector covering clause complexity, lexical rarity, and anaphora, negation, answerability, and intention grounding, all known to affect human comprehension. Using 369,837 real-world queries, we ask: Are there certain types of queries that make hallucination more likely? A large-scale analysis reveals a consistent "risk landscape": certain features such as deep clause nesting and underspecification align with higher hallucination propensity. In contrast, clear intention grounding and answerability align with lower hallucination rates. Others, including domain specificity, show mixed, dataset- and model-dependent effects. Thus, these findings establish an empirically observable query-feature representation correlated with hallucination risk, paving the way for guided query rewriting and future intervention studies.

Recently, large reasoning models have demonstrated strong mathematical and coding abilities, and deep search leverages their reasoning capabilities in challenging information retrieval tasks. Existing deep search works are generally limited to a single knowledge source, either local or the Web. However, enterprises often require private deep search systems that can leverage search tools over both local and the Web corpus. Simply training an agent equipped with multiple search tools using flat reinforcement learning (RL) is a straightforward idea, but it has problems such as low training data efficiency and poor mastery of complex tools. To address the above issue, we propose a hierarchical agentic deep search framework, HierSearch, trained with hierarchical RL. At the low level, a local deep search agent and a Web deep search agent are trained to retrieve evidence from their corresponding domains. At the high level, a planner agent coordinates low-level agents and provides the final answer. Moreover, to prevent direct answer copying and error propagation, we design a knowledge refiner that filters out hallucinations and irrelevant evidence returned by low-level agents. Experiments show that HierSearch achieves better performance compared to flat RL, and outperforms various deep search and multi-source retrieval-augmented generation baselines in six benchmarks across general, finance, and medical domains.

Deterministic inference is a comforting ideal in classical software: the same program on the same input should always produce the same output. As large language models move into real-world deployment, this ideal has been imported wholesale into inference stacks. Recent work from the Thinking Machines Lab has presented a detailed analysis of nondeterminism in LLM inference, showing how batch-invariant kernels and deterministic attention can enforce bitwise-identical outputs, positioning deterministic inference as a prerequisite for reproducibility and enterprise reliability. In this paper, we take the opposite stance. We argue that, for LLMs, deterministic inference kills. It kills the ability to model uncertainty, suppresses emergent abilities, collapses reasoning into a single brittle path, and weakens safety alignment by hiding tail risks. LLMs implement conditional distributions over outputs, not fixed functions. Collapsing these distributions to a single canonical completion may appear reassuring, but it systematically conceals properties central to artificial cognition. We instead advocate Stochastic CHAOS, treating distributional variability as a signal to be measured and controlled. Empirically, we show that deterministic inference is systematically misleading. Single-sample deterministic evaluation underestimates both capability and fragility, masking failure probability under paraphrases and noise. Phase-like transitions associated with emergent abilities disappear under greedy decoding. Multi-path reasoning degrades when forced onto deterministic backbones, reducing accuracy and diagnostic insight. Finally, deterministic evaluation underestimates safety risk by hiding rare but dangerous behaviors that appear only under multi-sample evaluation.

This paper proposes a methodology for discovering meaningful properties in data by exploring the latent space of unsupervised deep generative models. We combine manipulation of individual latent variables to extreme values with methods inspired by causal inference into an approach we call causal disentanglement with extreme values (CDEV) and show that this method yields insights for model interpretability. With this, we can test for what properties of unknown data the model encodes as meaningful, using it to glean insight into the communication system of sperm whales (Physeter macrocephalus), one of the most intriguing and understudied animal communication systems. The network architecture used has been shown to learn meaningful representations of speech; here, it is used as a learning mechanism to decipher the properties of another vocal communication system in which case we have no ground truth. The proposed methodology suggests that sperm whales encode information using the number of clicks in a sequence, the regularity of their timing, and audio properties such as the spectral mean and the acoustic regularity of the sequences. Some of these findings are consistent with existing hypotheses, while others are proposed for the first time. We also argue that our models uncover rules that govern the structure of units in the communication system and apply them while generating innovative data not shown during training. This paper suggests that an interpretation of the outputs of deep neural networks with causal inference methodology can be a viable strategy for approaching data about which little is known and presents another case of how deep learning can limit the hypothesis space. Finally, the proposed approach can be extended to other architectures and datasets.

We are born with the ability to learn concepts by comparing diverse observations. This helps us to understand the new world in a compositional manner and facilitates extrapolation, as objects naturally consist of multiple concepts. In this work, we argue that the cognitive mechanism of comparison, fundamental to human learning, is also vital for machines to recover true concepts underlying the data. This offers correctness guarantees for the field of concept learning, which, despite its impressive empirical successes, still lacks general theoretical support. Specifically, we aim to develop a theoretical framework for the identifiability of concepts with multiple classes of observations. We show that with sufficient diversity across classes, hidden concepts can be identified without assuming specific concept types, functional relations, or parametric generative models. Interestingly, even when conditions are not globally satisfied, we can still provide alternative guarantees for as many concepts as possible based on local comparisons, thereby extending the applicability of our theory to more flexible scenarios. Moreover, the hidden structure between classes and concepts can also be identified nonparametrically. We validate our theoretical results in both synthetic and real-world settings.

Although RLVR has become an essential component for developing advanced reasoning skills in LLMs, contemporary studies have documented training plateaus that emerge following thousands of optimization steps, demonstrating notable decreases in performance gains despite increased computational investment. This limitation stems from the sparse exploration patterns inherent in current RLVR practices, where models rely on limited rollouts that often miss critical reasoning paths and fail to provide systematic coverage of the solution space. We present DeepSearch, a framework that integrates Monte Carlo Tree Search directly into RLVR training. In contrast to existing methods that rely on tree search only at inference, DeepSearch embeds structured search into the training loop, enabling systematic exploration and fine-grained credit assignment across reasoning steps. Through training-time exploration, DeepSearch addresses the fundamental bottleneck of insufficient exploration, which leads to diminishing performance improvements over prolonged training steps. Our contributions include: (1) a global frontier selection strategy that prioritizes promising nodes across the search tree, (2) selection with entropy-based guidance that identifies confident paths for supervision, and (3) adaptive replay buffer training with solution caching for efficiency. Experiments on mathematical reasoning benchmarks show that DeepSearch achieves 62.95% average accuracy and establishes a new state-of-the-art for 1.5B reasoning models - using 5.7x fewer GPU hours than extended training approaches. These results highlight the importance of strategic exploration over brute-force scaling and demonstrate the promise of algorithmic innovation for advancing RLVR methodologies. DeepSearch establishes a new direction for scaling reasoning capabilities through systematic search rather than prolonged computation.

Recent Large Language Models (LLMs) have reported high accuracy on reasoning benchmarks. However, it is still unclear whether the observed results arise from true reasoning or from statistical recall of the training set. Inspired by the ladder of causation (Pearl, 2009) and its three levels (associations, interventions and counterfactuals), this paper introduces RE-IMAGINE, a framework to characterize a hierarchy of reasoning ability in LLMs, alongside an automated pipeline to generate problem variations at different levels of the hierarchy. By altering problems in an intermediate symbolic representation, RE-IMAGINE generates arbitrarily many problems that are not solvable using memorization alone. Moreover, the framework is general and can work across reasoning domains, including math, code, and logic. We demonstrate our framework on four widely-used benchmarks to evaluate several families of LLMs, and observe reductions in performance when the models are queried with problem variations. These assessments indicate a degree of reliance on statistical recall for past performance, and open the door to further research targeting skills across the reasoning hierarchy.

A set of novel approaches for estimating epistemic uncertainty in deep neural networks with a single forward pass has recently emerged as a valid alternative to Bayesian Neural Networks. On the premise of informative representations, these deterministic uncertainty methods (DUMs) achieve strong performance on detecting out-of-distribution (OOD) data while adding negligible computational costs at inference time. However, it remains unclear whether DUMs are well calibrated and can seamlessly scale to real-world applications - both prerequisites for their practical deployment. To this end, we first provide a taxonomy of DUMs, and evaluate their calibration under continuous distributional shifts. Then, we extend them to semantic segmentation. We find that, while DUMs scale to realistic vision tasks and perform well on OOD detection, the practicality of current methods is undermined by poor calibration under distributional shifts.

It is important for Large Language Models to be aware of the boundary of their knowledge, the mechanism of identifying known and unknown queries. This type of awareness can help models perform adaptive inference, such as invoking RAG, engaging in slow and deep thinking, or adopting the abstention mechanism, which is beneficial to the development of efficient and trustworthy AI. In this work, we propose a method to detect knowledge boundaries via Query-Level Uncertainty, which aims to determine if the model is able to address a given query without generating any tokens. To this end, we introduce a novel and training-free method called Internal Confidence, which leverages self-evaluations across layers and tokens. Empirical results on both factual QA and mathematical reasoning tasks demonstrate that our internal confidence can outperform several baselines. Furthermore, we showcase that our proposed method can be used for efficient RAG and model cascading, which is able to reduce inference costs while maintaining performance.

Large Language Models (LLMs) have demonstrated strong performance in handling complex tasks requiring both extensive knowledge and reasoning abilities. However, the existing LLM inference pipeline operates as an opaque process without explicit separation between knowledge retrieval and reasoning steps, making the model's decision-making process unclear and disorganized. This ambiguity can lead to issues such as hallucinations and knowledge forgetting, which significantly impact the reliability of LLMs in high-stakes domains. In this paper, we propose a new inference paradigm that decomposes the complex inference process into two distinct and clear actions: (1) memory recall: which retrieves relevant knowledge, and (2) reasoning: which performs logical steps based on the recalled knowledge. To facilitate this decomposition, we introduce two special tokens memory and reason, guiding the model to distinguish between steps that require knowledge retrieval and those that involve reasoning. Our experiment results show that this decomposition not only improves model performance but also enhances the interpretability of the inference process, enabling users to identify sources of error and refine model responses effectively. The code is available at https://github.com/MingyuJ666/Disentangling-Memory-and-Reasoning.

We introduce Inference-Time Intervention (ITI), a technique designed to enhance the truthfulness of large language models (LLMs). ITI operates by shifting model activations during inference, following a set of directions across a limited number of attention heads. This intervention significantly improves the performance of LLaMA models on the TruthfulQA benchmark. On an instruction-finetuned LLaMA called Alpaca, ITI improves its truthfulness from 32.5% to 65.1%. We identify a tradeoff between truthfulness and helpfulness and demonstrate how to balance it by tuning the intervention strength. ITI is minimally invasive and computationally inexpensive. Moreover, the technique is data efficient: while approaches like RLHF require extensive annotations, ITI locates truthful directions using only few hundred examples. Our findings suggest that LLMs may have an internal representation of the likelihood of something being true, even as they produce falsehoods on the surface.

This paper presents a systematic defense of large language model (LLM) hallucinations or 'confabulations' as a potential resource instead of a categorically negative pitfall. The standard view is that confabulations are inherently problematic and AI research should eliminate this flaw. In this paper, we argue and empirically demonstrate that measurable semantic characteristics of LLM confabulations mirror a human propensity to utilize increased narrativity as a cognitive resource for sense-making and communication. In other words, it has potential value. Specifically, we analyze popular hallucination benchmarks and reveal that hallucinated outputs display increased levels of narrativity and semantic coherence relative to veridical outputs. This finding reveals a tension in our usually dismissive understandings of confabulation. It suggests, counter-intuitively, that the tendency for LLMs to confabulate may be intimately associated with a positive capacity for coherent narrative-text generation.

The standard post-training recipe for large reasoning models, supervised fine-tuning followed by reinforcement learning (SFT-then-RL), may limit the benefits of the RL stage: while SFT imitates expert demonstrations, it often causes overconfidence and reduces generation diversity, leaving RL with a narrowed solution space to explore. Adding entropy regularization during SFT is not a cure-all; it tends to flatten token distributions toward uniformity, increasing entropy without improving meaningful exploration capability. In this paper, we propose CurioSFT, an entropy-preserving SFT method designed to enhance exploration capabilities through intrinsic curiosity. It consists of (a) Self-Exploratory Distillation, which distills the model toward a self-generated, temperature-scaled teacher to encourage exploration within its capability; and (b) Entropy-Guided Temperature Selection, which adaptively adjusts distillation strength to mitigate knowledge forgetting by amplifying exploration at reasoning tokens while stabilizing factual tokens. Extensive experiments on mathematical reasoning tasks demonstrate that, in SFT stage, CurioSFT outperforms the vanilla SFT by 2.5 points on in-distribution tasks and 2.9 points on out-of-distribution tasks. We also verify that exploration capabilities preserved during SFT successfully translate into concrete gains in RL stage, yielding an average improvement of 5.0 points.

Recent work suggests that large language models (LLMs) encode factuality signals in their internal representations, such as hidden states, attention weights, or token probabilities, implying that LLMs may "know what they don't know". However, LLMs can also produce factual errors by relying on shortcuts or spurious associations. These error are driven by the same training objective that encourage correct predictions, raising the question of whether internal computations can reliably distinguish between factual and hallucinated outputs. In this work, we conduct a mechanistic analysis of how LLMs internally process factual queries by comparing two types of hallucinations based on their reliance on subject information. We find that when hallucinations are associated with subject knowledge, LLMs employ the same internal recall process as for correct responses, leading to overlapping and indistinguishable hidden-state geometries. In contrast, hallucinations detached from subject knowledge produce distinct, clustered representations that make them detectable. These findings reveal a fundamental limitation: LLMs do not encode truthfulness in their internal states but only patterns of knowledge recall, demonstrating that "LLMs don't really know what they don't know".

Achieving effective test-time scaling requires models to engage in In-Context Exploration -- the intrinsic ability to generate, verify, and refine multiple reasoning hypotheses within a single continuous context. Grounded in State Coverage theory, our analysis identifies a critical bottleneck to enabling this capability: while broader state coverage requires longer reasoning trajectories, the probability of sampling such sequences decays exponentially during autoregressive generation, a phenomenon we term the ``Shallow Exploration Trap''. To bridge this gap, we propose Length-Incentivized Exploration(\method). This simple yet effective recipe explicitly encourages models to explore more via a length-based reward coupled with a redundancy penalty, thereby maximizing state coverage in two-step manner. Comprehensive experiments across different models (Qwen3, Llama) demonstrate that \method effectively incentivize in-context exploration. As a result, our method achieves an average improvement of 4.4\% on in-domain tasks and a 2.7\% gain on out-of-domain benchmarks.

Extensive work has shown that the performance and interpretability of commonsense reasoning can be improved via knowledge-augmented reasoning methods, where the knowledge that underpins the reasoning process is explicitly verbalized and utilized. However, existing implementations, including "chain-of-thought" and its variants, fall short in capturing the introspective nature of knowledge required in commonsense reasoning, and in accounting for the mutual adaptation between the generation and utilization of knowledge. We propose a novel method to develop an introspective commonsense reasoner, Crystal. To tackle commonsense problems, it first introspects for knowledge statements related to the given question, and subsequently makes an informed prediction that is grounded in the previously introspected knowledge. The knowledge introspection and knowledge-grounded reasoning modes of the model are tuned via reinforcement learning to mutually adapt, where the reward derives from the feedback given by the model itself. Experiments show that Crystal significantly outperforms both the standard supervised finetuning and chain-of-thought distilled methods, and enhances the transparency of the commonsense reasoning process. Our work ultimately validates the feasibility and potential of reinforcing a neural model with self-feedback.

Large language models (LLMs) are becoming deeply embedded in human communication and decision-making, yet they inherit the ambiguity, bias, and lack of direct access to truth inherent in language itself. While their outputs are fluent, emotionally resonant, and coherent, they are generated through statistical prediction rather than grounded reasoning. This creates the risk of hallucination, responses that sound convincing but lack factual validity. Building on Geoffrey Hinton's observation that AI mirrors human intuition rather than reasoning, this paper argues that LLMs operationalize System 1 cognition at scale: fast, associative, and persuasive, but without reflection or falsification. To address this, we introduce the Rose-Frame, a three-dimensional framework for diagnosing cognitive and epistemic drift in human-AI interaction. The three axes are: (i) Map vs. Territory, which distinguishes representations of reality (epistemology) from reality itself (ontology); (ii) Intuition vs. Reason, drawing on dual-process theory to separate fast, emotional judgments from slow, reflective thinking; and (iii) Conflict vs. Confirmation, which examines whether ideas are critically tested through disagreement or simply reinforced through mutual validation. Each dimension captures a distinct failure mode, and their combination amplifies misalignment. Rose-Frame does not attempt to fix LLMs with more data or rules. Instead, it offers a reflective tool that makes both the model's limitations and the user's assumptions visible, enabling more transparent and critically aware AI deployment. It reframes alignment as cognitive governance: intuition, whether human or artificial, must remain governed by human reason. Only by embedding reflective, falsifiable oversight can we align machine fluency with human understanding.

Despite the remarkable success of deep neural networks in a myriad of settings, several works have demonstrated their overwhelming sensitivity to near-imperceptible perturbations, known as adversarial attacks. On the other hand, prior works have also observed that deep networks can be under-sensitive, wherein large-magnitude perturbations in input space do not induce appreciable changes to network activations. In this work, we study in detail the phenomenon of under-sensitivity in vision models such as CNNs and Transformers, and present techniques to study the geometry and extent of "equi-confidence" level sets of such networks. We propose a Level Set Traversal algorithm that iteratively explores regions of high confidence with respect to the input space using orthogonal components of the local gradients. Given a source image, we use this algorithm to identify inputs that lie in the same equi-confidence level set as the source image despite being perceptually similar to arbitrary images from other classes. We further observe that the source image is linearly connected by a high-confidence path to these inputs, uncovering a star-like structure for level sets of deep networks. Furthermore, we attempt to identify and estimate the extent of these connected higher-dimensional regions over which the model maintains a high degree of confidence. The code for this project is publicly available at https://github.com/SriramB-98/blindspots-neurips-sub

Despite significant advancements, there is a limited understanding of how large language models (LLMs) utilize knowledge for reasoning. To address this, we propose a method that deconstructs complex real-world questions into a graph, representing each question as a node with parent nodes of background knowledge needed to solve the question. We develop the DepthQA dataset, deconstructing questions into three depths: (i) recalling conceptual knowledge, (ii) applying procedural knowledge, and (iii) analyzing strategic knowledge. Based on a hierarchical graph, we quantify forward discrepancy, discrepancies in LLMs' performance on simpler sub-problems versus complex questions. We also measure backward discrepancy, where LLMs answer complex questions but struggle with simpler ones. Our analysis shows that smaller models have more discrepancies than larger models. Additionally, guiding models from simpler to complex questions through multi-turn interactions improves performance across model sizes, highlighting the importance of structured intermediate steps in knowledge reasoning. This work enhances our understanding of LLM reasoning and suggests ways to improve their problem-solving abilities.

Large Language Models are trained on vast amounts of text from the internet, which contains both factual and misleading information about the world. Can language models discern truth from falsehood in this contradicting data? Expanding on the view that LLMs can model different agents producing the corpora, we hypothesize that they can cluster truthful text by modeling a truthful persona: a group of agents that are likely to produce truthful text and share similar features. For example, trustworthy sources like Wikipedia and Science usually use formal writing styles and make consistent claims. By modeling this persona, LLMs can generalize truthfulness beyond the specific contexts in which each agent generated the training text. For example, the model can infer that the agent "Wikipedia" will behave truthfully on topics that were only generated by "Science" because they share a persona. We first show evidence for the persona hypothesis via two observations: (1) we can probe whether a model's answer will be truthful before it is generated; (2) finetuning a model on a set of facts improves its truthfulness on unseen topics. Next, using arithmetics as a synthetic environment, we show that language models can separate true and false statements, and generalize truthfulness across agents; but only if agents in the training data share a truthful generative process that enables the creation of a truthful persona. Overall, our findings suggest that models can exploit hierarchical structures in the data to learn abstract concepts like truthfulness.

Identifying how much a model {p}_{theta}(Y|X) knows about the stochastic real-world process p(Y|X) it was trained on is important to ensure it avoids producing incorrect or "hallucinated" answers or taking unsafe actions. But this is difficult for generative models because probabilistic predictions do not distinguish between per-response noise (aleatoric uncertainty) and lack of knowledge about the process (epistemic uncertainty), and existing epistemic uncertainty quantification techniques tend to be overconfident when the model underfits. We propose a general strategy for teaching a model to both approximate p(Y|X) and also estimate the remaining gaps between {p}_{theta}(Y|X) and p(Y|X): train it to predict pairs of independent responses drawn from the true conditional distribution, allow it to "cheat" by observing one response while predicting the other, then measure how much it cheats. Remarkably, we prove that being good at cheating (i.e. cheating whenever it improves your prediction) is equivalent to being second-order calibrated, a principled extension of ordinary calibration that allows us to construct provably-correct frequentist confidence intervals for p(Y|X) and detect incorrect responses with high probability. We demonstrate empirically that our approach accurately estimates how much models don't know across ambiguous image classification, (synthetic) language modeling, and partially-observable navigation tasks, outperforming existing techniques.

Reasoning models represented by the Deepseek-R1-Distill series have been widely adopted by the open-source community due to their strong performance in mathematics, science, programming, and other domains. However, our study reveals that their benchmark evaluation results are subject to significant fluctuations caused by various factors. Subtle differences in evaluation conditions can lead to substantial variations in results. Similar phenomena are observed in other open-source inference models fine-tuned based on the Deepseek-R1-Distill series, as well as in the QwQ-32B model, making their claimed performance improvements difficult to reproduce reliably. Therefore, we advocate for the establishment of a more rigorous paradigm for model performance evaluation and present our empirical assessments of the Deepseek-R1-Distill series models.

Hallucination is a persistent challenge in large language models (LLMs), where even with rigorous quality control, models often generate distorted facts. This paradox, in which error generation continues despite high-quality training data, calls for a deeper understanding of the underlying LLM mechanisms. To address it, we propose a novel concept: knowledge overshadowing, where model's dominant knowledge can obscure less prominent knowledge during text generation, causing the model to fabricate inaccurate details. Building on this idea, we introduce a novel framework to quantify factual hallucinations by modeling knowledge overshadowing. Central to our approach is the log-linear law, which predicts that the rate of factual hallucination increases linearly with the logarithmic scale of (1) Knowledge Popularity, (2) Knowledge Length, and (3) Model Size. The law provides a means to preemptively quantify hallucinations, offering foresight into their occurrence even before model training or inference. Built on overshadowing effect, we propose a new decoding strategy CoDa, to mitigate hallucinations, which notably enhance model factuality on Overshadow (27.9%), MemoTrap (13.1%) and NQ-Swap (18.3%). Our findings not only deepen understandings of the underlying mechanisms behind hallucinations but also provide actionable insights for developing more predictable and controllable language models.

This paper presents an in-depth analysis of Large Language Models (LLMs), focusing on LLaMA, a prominent open-source foundational model in natural language processing. Instead of assessing LLaMA through its generative output, we design multiple-choice tasks to probe its intrinsic understanding in high-order tasks such as reasoning and computation. We examine the model horizontally, comparing different sizes, and vertically, assessing different layers. We unveil several key and uncommon findings based on the designed probing tasks: (1) Horizontally, enlarging model sizes almost could not automatically impart additional knowledge or computational prowess. Instead, it can enhance reasoning abilities, especially in math problem solving, and helps reduce hallucinations, but only beyond certain size thresholds; (2) In vertical analysis, the lower layers of LLaMA lack substantial arithmetic and factual knowledge, showcasing logical thinking, multilingual and recognitive abilities, with top layers housing most computational power and real-world knowledge.

Humans acquire knowledge by observing the external world, but also by introspection. Introspection gives a person privileged access to their current state of mind (e.g., thoughts and feelings) that is not accessible to external observers. Can LLMs introspect? We define introspection as acquiring knowledge that is not contained in or derived from training data but instead originates from internal states. Such a capability could enhance model interpretability. Instead of painstakingly analyzing a model's internal workings, we could simply ask the model about its beliefs, world models, and goals. More speculatively, an introspective model might self-report on whether it possesses certain internal states such as subjective feelings or desires and this could inform us about the moral status of these states. Such self-reports would not be entirely dictated by the model's training data. We study introspection by finetuning LLMs to predict properties of their own behavior in hypothetical scenarios. For example, "Given the input P, would your output favor the short- or long-term option?" If a model M1 can introspect, it should outperform a different model M2 in predicting M1's behavior even if M2 is trained on M1's ground-truth behavior. The idea is that M1 has privileged access to its own behavioral tendencies, and this enables it to predict itself better than M2 (even if M2 is generally stronger). In experiments with GPT-4, GPT-4o, and Llama-3 models (each finetuned to predict itself), we find that the model M1 outperforms M2 in predicting itself, providing evidence for introspection. Notably, M1 continues to predict its behavior accurately even after we intentionally modify its ground-truth behavior. However, while we successfully elicit introspection on simple tasks, we are unsuccessful on more complex tasks or those requiring out-of-distribution generalization.

Information retrieval is a cornerstone of modern knowledge acquisition, enabling billions of queries each day across diverse domains. However, traditional keyword-based search engines are increasingly inadequate for handling complex, multi-step information needs. Our position is that Large Language Models (LLMs), endowed with reasoning and agentic capabilities, are ushering in a new paradigm termed Agentic Deep Research. These systems transcend conventional information search techniques by tightly integrating autonomous reasoning, iterative retrieval, and information synthesis into a dynamic feedback loop. We trace the evolution from static web search to interactive, agent-based systems that plan, explore, and learn. We also introduce a test-time scaling law to formalize the impact of computational depth on reasoning and search. Supported by benchmark results and the rise of open-source implementations, we demonstrate that Agentic Deep Research not only significantly outperforms existing approaches, but is also poised to become the dominant paradigm for future information seeking. All the related resources, including industry products, research papers, benchmark datasets, and open-source implementations, are collected for the community in https://github.com/DavidZWZ/Awesome-Deep-Research.

Retrieval-Augmented Generation (RAG) systems remain susceptible to hallucinations despite grounding in retrieved evidence. While current detection methods leverage embedding similarity and natural language inference (NLI), their reliability in safety-critical settings remains unproven. We apply conformal prediction to RAG hallucination detection, transforming heuristic scores into decision sets with finite-sample coverage guarantees (1-alpha). Using calibration sets of n=600, we demonstrate a fundamental dichotomy: on synthetic hallucinations (Natural Questions), embedding methods achieve 95% coverage with 0% False Positive Rate (FPR). However, on real hallucinations from RLHF-aligned models (HaluEval), the same methods fail catastrophically, yielding 100% FPR at target coverage. We analyze this failure through the lens of distributional tails, showing that while NLI models achieve acceptable AUC (0.81), the "hardest" hallucinations are semantically indistinguishable from faithful responses, forcing conformal thresholds to reject nearly all valid outputs. Crucially, GPT-4 as a judge achieves 7% FPR (95% CI:[3.4%, 13.7%]) on the same data, proving the task is solvable via reasoning but opaque to surface-level semantics--a phenomenon we term the "Semantic Illusion."

One way to address safety risks from large language models (LLMs) is to censor dangerous knowledge from their training data. While this removes the explicit information, implicit information can remain scattered across various training documents. Could an LLM infer the censored knowledge by piecing together these implicit hints? As a step towards answering this question, we study inductive out-of-context reasoning (OOCR), a type of generalization in which LLMs infer latent information from evidence distributed across training documents and apply it to downstream tasks without in-context learning. Using a suite of five tasks, we demonstrate that frontier LLMs can perform inductive OOCR. In one experiment we finetune an LLM on a corpus consisting only of distances between an unknown city and other known cities. Remarkably, without in-context examples or Chain of Thought, the LLM can verbalize that the unknown city is Paris and use this fact to answer downstream questions. Further experiments show that LLMs trained only on individual coin flip outcomes can verbalize whether the coin is biased, and those trained only on pairs (x,f(x)) can articulate a definition of f and compute inverses. While OOCR succeeds in a range of cases, we also show that it is unreliable, particularly for smaller LLMs learning complex structures. Overall, the ability of LLMs to "connect the dots" without explicit in-context learning poses a potential obstacle to monitoring and controlling the knowledge acquired by LLMs.

When language models correctly parse "The cat that the dog chased meowed," are they analyzing syntax or simply familiar with dogs chasing cats? Despite extensive benchmarking, we lack methods to distinguish structural understanding from semantic pattern matching. We introduce CenterBench, a dataset of 9,720 comprehension questions on center-embedded sentences (like "The cat [that the dog chased] meowed") where relative clauses nest recursively, creating processing demands from simple to deeply nested structures. Each sentence has a syntactically identical but semantically implausible counterpart (e.g., mailmen prescribe medicine, doctors deliver mail) and six comprehension questions testing surface understanding, syntactic dependencies, and causal reasoning. Testing six models reveals that performance gaps between plausible and implausible sentences widen systematically with complexity, with models showing median gaps up to 26.8 percentage points, quantifying when they abandon structural analysis for semantic associations. Notably, semantic plausibility harms performance on questions about resulting actions, where following causal relationships matters more than semantic coherence. Reasoning models improve accuracy but their traces show semantic shortcuts, overthinking, and answer refusal. Unlike models whose plausibility advantage systematically widens with complexity, humans shows variable semantic effects. CenterBench provides the first framework to identify when models shift from structural analysis to pattern matching.

Large reasoning models (LRMs) achieve strong performance on mathematical reasoning tasks, often attributed to their capability to generate explicit chain-of-thought (CoT) explanations. However, recent work shows that LRMs often arrive at the correct answer before completing these textual reasoning steps, indicating the presence of latent reasoning -- internal, non-verbal computation encoded in hidden states. While this phenomenon has been explored in English, its multilingual behavior remains largely unknown. In this paper, we conduct a systematic investigation of multilingual latent reasoning in LRMs across 11 languages. Using a truncation-based strategy, we examine how the correct answer emerges as the model is given only partial reasoning traces, allowing us to measure stepwise latent prediction formation. Our results reveal clear evidence of multilingual latent reasoning, though unevenly: strong in resource-rich languages, weaker in low-resource ones, and broadly less observable on harder benchmarks. To understand whether these differences reflect distinct internal mechanisms, we further perform representational analyses. Despite surface-level disparities, we find that the internal evolution of predictions is highly consistent across languages and broadly aligns with English -- a pattern suggesting an English-centered latent reasoning pathway.

We construct evaluation tasks where extending the reasoning length of Large Reasoning Models (LRMs) deteriorates performance, exhibiting an inverse scaling relationship between test-time compute and accuracy. Our evaluation tasks span four categories: simple counting tasks with distractors, regression tasks with spurious features, deduction tasks with constraint tracking, and advanced AI risks. We identify five distinct failure modes when models reason for longer: 1) Claude models become increasingly distracted by irrelevant information; 2) OpenAI o-series models resist distractors but overfit to problem framings; 3) models shift from reasonable priors to spurious correlations; 4) all models show difficulties in maintaining focus on complex deductive tasks; and 5) extended reasoning may amplify concerning behaviors, with Claude Sonnet 4 showing increased expressions of self-preservation. These findings suggest that while test-time compute scaling remains promising for improving model capabilities, it may inadvertently reinforce problematic reasoning patterns. Our results demonstrate the importance of evaluating models across diverse reasoning lengths to identify and address these failure modes in LRMs.

Despite the superior performance of Large Reasoning Models (LRMs), their reasoning behaviors are often counterintuitive, leading to suboptimal reasoning capabilities. To theoretically formalize the desired reasoning behaviors, this paper presents the Laws of Reasoning (LoRe), a unified framework that characterizes intrinsic reasoning patterns in LRMs. We first propose compute law with the hypothesis that the reasoning compute should scale linearly with question complexity. Beyond compute, we extend LoRe with a supplementary accuracy law. Since the question complexity is difficult to quantify in practice, we examine these hypotheses by two properties of the laws, monotonicity and compositionality. We therefore introduce LoRe-Bench, a benchmark that systematically measures these two tractable properties for large reasoning models. Evaluation shows that most reasoning models exhibit reasonable monotonicity but lack compositionality. In response, we develop an effective finetuning approach that enforces compute-law compositionality. Extensive empirical studies demonstrate that better compliance with compute laws yields consistently improved reasoning performance on multiple benchmarks, and uncovers synergistic effects across properties and laws. Project page: https://lore-project.github.io/